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Abstract 
African affairs have traditionally not occupied a central place in Norway’s official 
foreign policy, and relations with countries in West Africa have been limited. 
However, in recent years, resource-rich countries such as Angola – Africa’s 
largest oil producer – have become the focus of Norwegian strategic interests. 
Private and public investments are increasing rapidly, paralleling a larger focus 
on aid. Today, Angola is a core country within Norway’s most prominent 
petroleum-related assistant programme, Oil for Development (OfD). 
 
This thesis will aim to contribute, by means of a critical political economy 
analysis, to a better understanding of Norway’s role in Angola through OfD. 
Specifically, this study aims to question who and what structures Norway really is 
aiding in Angola.  Such an objective will be achieved by firstly using critical 
theory to demonstrate Norway’s role as a traditional middle power – through 
which Norway seeks to export an altruistic perception of a ‘do-good- image’ – is 
underpinned by a deeper national self-interest. Secondly, the thesis questions 
the theoretical foundation of OfD, and, thirdly, it attempts to identify whom the 
OfD programme is aiding. Ultimately, the thesis questions whether Norway is 
promoting sustainable development in Angola, or whether, instead, it is 
contributing to maintaining a status quo, from which Norway as a middle power 
continues to benefit.  
The study illustrates that Norway, as a middle power, has neither the capacity 
nor the national self-interest to achieve fundamental change in Angola. Norway’s 
commitment to the good governance agenda, and the belief in solutions offered 
by the resource curse thesis, is tackling the symptoms of Angola’s 
underdevelopment, rather than its root causes. OfD adopts a state-centric 
approach, which accepts the political economy structures in Angola, and gives 
limited attention to global structures and civil society. The thesis offers an 
alternative analysis, which illustrates how OfD is masking a neo-liberal 
development approach by incorporating Norwegian business interests and 
development goals in the same programme.  
 v 
Opsomming 
Afrika sake het tradisioneel nie 'n sentrale plek in Noorweë se amptelike 
buitelandse beleid beklee nie, en verhoudings met die westelike deel van die 
Afrika-kontinent is beperk. Tydens die afgelope jare het olie-ryk lande, soos 
Angola, egter die fokus van Noorweegse strategiese belange geword. Angola is 
vandag 'n kern land binne Noorweë se mees prominente petroleum-verwante 
hulpverleningsprogram, Oil for Development (OfD). 
  
Hierdie tesis het ten doel om, deur middel van 'n kritiese politieke ekonomie 
ontleding, by te dra tot ’n beter begrip van Noorweë se rol in Angola deur die 
OfD. Spesifiek  bevraagteken hierdie studie aan wie en watter strukture in Angola 
Noorweë hulp verleen. Dit sal gedoen word deur eerstens gebruik te maak van 
kritiese teorie om te demonstreer dat Noorweë se rol as 'n tradisionele 
middelmoondheid – waardeur Noorweë poog om 'n altruïstiese persepsie van 
die staat uit te dra – onderskryf word deur 'n dieper nasionale selfbelang.  
Tweedens sal hierdie studie die teoretiese begronding van OfD bevraagteken, en 
derdens poog om te identifiseer wie deur die OfD program ondersteun word. 
Laastens sal die tesis bevraagteken of Noorweë volhoubare ontwikkeling in 
Angola bevorder, en eerder bydra tot die instandhouding van die status quo, 
waaruit Noorweë as 'n middelmoondheid voordeel trek. 
 
Die studie sal illustreer dat Noorweë, as ‘n middelmoondheid, nie die kapasiteit 
of die nasionale selfbelang het om fundamentele verandering in Angola te weeg 
te bring nie. Norweë se ondersteuning van die ‘good governance’ agenda, en 
oplossings wat deur die sogenaamde ‘hulpbronvloek’ tesis aangebied word, 
spreek die simptome van Angola se onder-ontwikkeldheid aan, eerder as die 
kernoorsake. OfD funksioneer op grond van ‘n staat-sentriese benadering, wat 
die politieke ekonomiese strukture in Angola aanvaar, en beperkte aandag aan 
globale strukture en die burgerlike samelewing gee. Hierdie tesis bied ‘n 
alternatiewe analise, wat wys hoe OfD eintlik ‘n neoliberale 
ontwikkelingsbenadering volg wat Noorweegse besigheids- en 
ontwikkelingsdoelwitte in dieselfde program inkorporeer.  
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND, AIM AND METHOD 
 
1.1  Background – the Regime of Goodwill 
The book Important superpower – Potent small state1 was published in Norway in 
1988, and has, since then, had significant influence on Norway’s foreign policy 
and on the Norwegian self-image. Terms as ‘humanitarian superpower’, ‘moral 
champion’, ‘pioneer’ and ‘vanguard’ have influenced the rhetoric of Norwegian 
foreign policy, the Norwegian self-image, and the role that the country played as 
a bridge-builder between the North, South, East and West during the Cold War. 
Its self-image, as a vanguard of development and humanitarian assistance, was 
shaped throughout the 1960s, 1970s and the 1980s (Tvedt, 2003). Aid2 was seen 
as a significant expression of Norwegian self-image, and before peace activism 
became a central part of Norwegian foreign policy in the 1990s, the aid given to 
the Third World was the most visibly moral-based practice in Norwegian foreign 
policy (NUPI, 2007:16).  There is a perception amongst Norwegians that aid 
given to the Third World is founded on solidarity, and that Norway is a neutral 
donor without self-interest in terms of the aid given to underdeveloped 
countries. In essence, the granting of aid is based on a regime of goodwill 
(Tostensen, 2002; Report to the Storting, no. 13, 2008–2009:5). 
African affairs have traditionally not occupied a central place in Norway’s official 
foreign policy, and, historically, there has been a limited relation between 
Norway and Africa, especially in the West African region. It can, to a large degree, 
be argued that Norway never really had a conscious and coherent African policy, 
and that aid has dominated its relationship with the African continent (Tostesen, 
2002). Aid has traditionally been linked to missionary work and solidarity 
                                                        
1 The author of the book was Jan Egeland. Egeland has, since then, not only been a 
significant figure in Norwegian politics, but has also been recognised internationally 
through his position as United Nations Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs 
and Emergency Relief. Today he is the head of the Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs (NUPI).  
2 For the purpose of this thesis, the concept of aid refers to Norway’s Overall 
Development Assistance (ODA). The notion of aid will, thus, incorporate both 
humanitarian and development assistance.  
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groups, but, after the Cold War, the engagement expanded into such areas as 
political dialogue, conflict resolution, and environment issues (Foreign Ministry, 
2007:2). 
In 1995, one could observe a shift in countries receiving aid from Norway. 
Norway’s relationship with India, which had been one of the former country’s 
main aid recipients since the 1950s, ended, and there was a shift towards 
striving to attain more strategic goals in West Africa (Ruud and Kjerland, 2003).  
Since 1995, the Norwegian presence has increased drastically in Africa, and 
today Norway (which is a nation of 4.7 million people) is represented by 18 
embassies on the continent. Moreover, as of 2007, eight of the ten largest 
recipients of Norwegian aid have been located in Africa (Foreign Ministry, 2007). 
Commercial and private investments and trade have increased substantially, and 
Africa represents the largest investment area outside Europe. The country of 
Angola is experiencing the largest increase in investment, both from the 
Norwegian government and the private sector (Foreign Ministry, 2007; Hanssen, 
2008a).  
The concept ‘national self-interest’ is rarely mentioned when one talks of 
Norwegian foreign policy, or indeed of Norwegian politics in general (Lunde and 
Thune, 2008). Such rare mention is not necessarily because the motive is not 
present in the foreign policy of the nation, but it is rather because, up until now, 
it has not been seen as a legitimate reason for action, so that the term has been 
avoided (Nyhamar, 2007).  The geographical shift that occurred in aid-receiving 
countries in 1995 was later accompanied by a shift in rhetoric, with the term 
‘national self-interest’ becoming much more evident in Norwegian foreign aid 
policy (Lunde and Thune, 2008).  
After its national election in 2005, Norway experienced a change in government, 
where the new representatives from the Foreign Ministry initiated a discussion 
regarding Norway’s changing role in a globalised world. In the debate, the 
message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, was clear: 
Norway is a country one should be able to recognise (Dagens Næringsliv, 17 
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October, 2005), indicating that the central objective was to maintain its image as 
an exceptional do-good nation, even though the context was changing.  
This thesis aims to go beyond a descriptive analysis of Norway’s role as an aid 
donor. It aims to critically ask a broader question of who and what structures 
Norway is assisting through its petroleum-related aid - where Norway argue that 
they have a comparative advantage and where it can make a difference. At the 
same time, Norway claims that there is no self-interest in its aid programme. 
Samir Amin (2010) argues that a critique of aid can only be conducted within the 
framework of political economy, which is what this thesis sets out to do. By 
approaching the petroleum-related aid programme, Oil for Development (OfD), 
from a critical political economy approach, the thesis aims to identify Norway’s 
role as an aid donor in Angola. The study also indirectly questions Norway’s 
sense of altruism in relation to aid. 
1.2  Problem Statement and Rationale 
The trend in aid has illustrated that aid is not as altruistic as one might think, and 
often the actual needs of the recipient country are not what is regarded as the 
most essential (Barratt, 2005; Stokke, 1995). The noted shift in the aid debate in 
Norway has included very few voices that question whether Norway should be a 
donor country at all. Instead, the debate in recent years has moved onto a 
discussion regarding the efficiency and effects of the aid offered (NUPI, 2007).   
In 2005, the Norwegian government launched the aid programme OfD, based on 
the country’s knowledge and experience in successful petroleum sector 
management. Oil was discovered in Norway in 1969, and has, ever since, played 
a significant role in the country’s development from a rather poor nation into a 
successful welfare state. With good resource management by strong state 
institutions, Norway has avoided the ‘resource curse’ phenomenon that many 
African nations are facing today. The countries concerned are rich in certain 
types of resources, such as oil, but have not been able to achieve prosperity to 
the degree that Norway has. Rather, natural resources on the African continent 
are regarded as having fuelled civil wars, having generated increased inequality, 
and having mired people in extreme poverty (Collier, 2007; Kolstad, Wiig and 
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Williams, 2009).  The paradox of being a country rich in resources, yet low in 
human development and high inequality, is the condition in which the current 
case study, namely Angola, finds itself, which will be explored in Chapter Four.  
OfD has become one of Norway’s most predominant aid programmes, but also a 
programme that has received heavy criticism from various angles. The current 
Minister of International Development, Erik Solheim, argues that “oil should not 
be a curse, rather a blessing” (Norad, 2008:2) and the programme accordingly 
sets out to build on the Norwegian experience. However, the critique to which 
Norway has been subject has focused on how Norway’s experience is not 
applicable to many of the Third World countries in which the country has made 
its presence felt. Both the global context and Norway’s own history and political 
setting have been quite different from what many of the countries that are 
trapped in the resource curse today are experiencing. Due consideration must be 
given to how the Norwegian experience can contribute to improvements in such 
an unstable region as West Africa, where one finds some of the world’s most 
corrupt governments. and where many of the countries are recovering from war, 
so that the state of peace is still fragile. Such a context gives immediate rise to 
questions revolving around the issues of self-interest and altruism.   
With the assumption that aid is given in solidarity, and that there is little critical 
analysis of Norway’s expansion on the African continent, the focus tends to be 
rather unbalanced. Although the government is able to focus on the aid given, 
little attention has been directed to what Norway receives in return Africa (NUPI, 
2007). The reality that Norway is one of the few countries in the world that gives 
1 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to aid is something of which most 
Norwegians are aware. However, not many Norwegians are aware of the fact that 
Statoil’s3 contribution to the Norwegian government, in the form of tax and stock 
revenues from oil extracted in Angola, equals the amount of aid that Norway 
gives to Africa as a whole (Hansen, 2007). 
                                                        
3 Statoil is Norway’s largest oil company. When it was established in 1972, it was wholly 
state-owned. In 2001 it was decided by the Norwegian Storting (Parliament) partly to 
privatise Statoil, and today the Norwegian government have a 67 per cent share in the 
company.     
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Norway’s role has become complex, consisting of many diversified actors, with 
the Norwegian embassies abroad being instructed to assist Norwegian 
companies to expand, while at the same time administrating large development 
projects. Ambiguity of roles and conflict of interest can, therefore, be seen to 
emerge. The example of Angola, where the Norwegian embassy (as an aid agent) 
and Statoil (as a business agent) share offices in Luanda, is often used as a clear-
cut example of conflict of interest in a situation that creates a reliability problem, 
since the relations between political interests and business interests are very 
closely aligned.   
Angola is most often portrayed rather simplistically in Norway, as a democratic 
country with large public–private partnership opportunities (e.g. Speed, 2010). 
In March 2009, the Norwegian Foreign Minister – on his first official visit to 
Africa since he was elected in 2005 – invited potential business investors from 
Norway to join him on an official trip to Luanda to meet representatives of the 
Angolan government to discuss suitable business opportunities (Speed, 2010). 
Whereas foreign direct investment in Angola obviously should be explored as an 
opportunity for creating development, there is also an explicit lack of critical 
analysis and attitude towards the so-called democratic system in Angola, in 
which country no presidential election has taken place since 1992.   
No strong tradition exists in Norway of discussing the main lines of the foreign 
policy, least of all the concept of national self-interest in relation to the aid given 
to the Third World (Lunde and Thune, 2008; Tostensen, 2002). In addition, the 
issue of both private and public Norwegian expansion into West Africa, which is 
home to some of the world’s most corrupt governments and institutions, has 
been void of debate in academic circles, as well as in the public media.   
What makes research on the topic important is the Norwegian assumption that 
the nation always acts out of solidarity towards less fortunate countries, and not 
out of self-interest (Tvedt, 2003). As the Norwegian presence in Angola 
increases, an awareness of the consequences of such engagement in both a 
historical and a holistic perspective, becomes ever more essential. Aid is often 
seen to prop up the regime in power in a recipient state, and not necessarily as 
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helping the poorest members of the society or as promoting forces that can bring 
about change. In so doing, it exacerbates societal inequalities, and it becomes of 
great importance to understand what and whom one is aiding (Barratt, 2005). 
Both Norway’s private and public increased presence in Africa have implications 
for the country’s relationship with, and its role in relation to, countries on the 
continent. Such implications need to be debated so that Norway does not 
automatically become a nation that is represented as a cause in terms of the 
‘resource curse’ (Hanssen, 2008b). 
1.3 Research Aims 
Building on Norway’s self-image as a neutral aid donor, the overarching aim of 
this thesis is to critically explore Norway’s role in Angola through the OfD 
programme. The exploration will take the form of: 
 exploring Norway’s role as a middle power, using critical theory; 
 questioning the theoretical foundation of Norway’s petroleum-related 
aid to such African countries as Angola;  
 identifying what structures the OfD programme is aiding, in order 
better to understand Norway’s role in Angola; and 
 identifying whether Norway is promoting sustainable development or 
whether it is, to a larger extent, contributing to the maintenance of 
the a status quo, from which Norway, as a middle power, benefits. 
1.4 Political Economy and Critical Theory 
There has been a dominance of realism in the study of international relations, 
which has led to a focus on, and a concern with, analysing relations between 
sovereign states, as well as the causes of war and alternative forms of 
cooperation. The dominance of neo-realism has been challenged, and, since the 
1960s, other branches of social science have been offering alternative 
methodological and theoretical means of explaining the international state of 
affairs (Halliday, 1990).  
The school of International Political Economy (IPE) was established during the 
1970s, in an attempt to link the fields of economy with political activity (Cohen, 
 7 
2007; Hoffman, 1987). Despite the fields of politics and economy having always 
been interlinked, it is only since the 1970s that the field has gained proper 
attention within the school of international relations. Since Susan Strange 
addressed the gap between the two fields in 1970 in her article ‘International 
Relations and International Economics: A mutual Neglect’, political economy has 
experienced major growth in the study of International Relations. Strange 
described IPE as a method of analysing areas concerning the social, political and 
economic arrangements affecting the global systems of production, exchange and 
distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein (Mgonja and Makombe, 
2009).  
A critical approach to political economy theory has demanded a reconsideration 
of the relationship between different agents and institutions (Mgonja and 
Makombe, 2009). Rather than being problem-solving, the critical approach does 
not take any structures (such as those pertaining to North–South, gender, and 
core–periphery) for granted, but rather questions from where such structures 
and hierarchies historically come. Robert Cox (1987) argues that these 
structures are a product of human activity through history, during which people 
have learned to behave within the framework of social and historical blocks. 
However, the structures are continually changing, and people must learn to 
understand them and how they have developed in order to be able to change 
them. Political economy theory has developed as an alternative, critical 
perspective within this field of study, and has the strength “through the process 
of self-understanding and self-reflection… to provide a critique of the existing 
social order and point to its immanent capacity for change and for the realisation 
of human potential” (Hoffman, 1987:232).     
The main argument for stating that a critical approach will be useful when 
analysing international relations is, first and foremost, based on the broad array 
of issues that a theoretical framework can explain. Such issues as poverty, 
inequality and marginalised states and forces in the global economy are arguably 
given insufficient analytical clout in other mainstream theories. The fact 
strengthens the usefulness of a critical analytical framework. Critical political 
economy theory emphasises history and the necessity of studying history when 
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looking at international relations, and does not accept the status quo as being 
natural and immutable. Neither the structure of the state, nor the manner in 
which states relate to one another, is natural, but is, rather, a product of 
historical forces. This also implies that the nature of, and the relations between, 
states will not always remain the same, but are likely to change in the future.  
This thesis uses many voices within critical theory, political economy and 
theories on hegemony, placing a focus on the interaction between the political, 
economic and social aspects of systems of governance on the global and national 
level. Robert Cox represents an important break in mainstream IR, and in the 
school of IPE, presenting a theoretical framework that is situated within a 
historical materialist approach.  By not only aiming to contribute with new 
analyses of a changing world, Cox (1987), in his method, aims to contribute new 
ways of analysing and of critically engaging with alternative ways, which not 
only describe the world, but which also aim to explain how and why the situation 
came to be so, and more importantly, how it can change.  John Saul (2006:1) 
argues that the contemporary world, which is marked by great inequalities, can 
“easily be understood primarily in terms of the imperatives of the present global 
reality. Nonetheless, it is at least as important to view the process of the making 
of this unequal world in carefully articulated historical perspective.”   
A critical approach can be seen as a viable alternative to the more traditional and 
orthodox way of theorising foreign policy and the middle power role in the 
contemporary world order in several different ways. One is the way in which the 
critical approaches of middlepowermanship, and, in particular, the notion of 
hegemony, endorse a way of relating the global context to foreign policy-making 
(Neufeld, 1995). By drawing on the Gramscian approach to the study of world 
order, the global politico-economic setting of Norwegian foreign policy will be 
outlined. By illustrating how Norway fits into the critical description of 
traditional middle power, which was elaborated on by the neo-Gramscian 
scholar Eduard Jordaan, the thesis will place Norway within the global economy 
and, as part of a neo-liberal project, question assumptions and look for 
contradictions that will give a better understanding of Norway’s role in Angola. 
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The field of political economy connotes the relationship between ‘power’ and 
‘wealth’, and one of the fields where this link becomes most clear is in the 
petroleum industry in African petro-states (Obi, 2007). In this thesis, a critical 
political economy approach will be used to theorise about the petroleum-related 
assistance programme that Norway, as a middle power, offers to African petro-
states. The thesis will, in addition, analyse the structures that are supported by 
the programme in Angola, a typical petro-state in Africa. In a critical vein, the 
thesis will not only consider the role of the state, but it will, rather, include a 
focus on the global level and on civil society, illustrating a more complex reality 
that is influenced by several different actors.4  
1.5 Methodology 
The purpose of the current study is to explore Norway’s role as an aid agent 
through studying the role that is played by OfD in Angola. Such an exploration 
should enable a better understanding to be gained of the system that Norway is 
aiding. In other words, the research can be categorised as being both of a 
descriptive and an exploratory nature, since the topic is relatively unresearched, 
and as it also aims to explore Norway’s aid programme, OfD. The purpose of 
exploratory research is to gain insight into a situation, even though the situation 
or phenomenon is of limited scope in the context of a more complex reality (Yin, 
2003).   
Based on the nature of the research question, the qualitative research method 
was chosen. According to Marshall and Rossman (2006:2), qualitative research 
forms “a broad approach to the study of social phenomena; its various genres are 
naturalistic and interpretative, and they draw on multiple methods of inquiry”. 
Since the use of statistical data would not widen the understanding of the 
research, a qualitative research method was preferred.  
                                                        
4
 Robert Keohane and Helen Milner (eds. 1997) argue that “we can no longer understand 
politics within countries – what we still conventionally call ‘domestic’ politics – without 
comprehending the nature of the linkages between national economies and the world 
economy, and changes in such linkages”.  
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1.5.1 Research Design 
Bless and Higson-Smith (1995:43) argue that there are two alternatives for the 
design of exploratory and descriptive research, namely either a case study or a 
survey.  Due to the study’s focus, the research design was planned around a case 
study approach, which is a way of organising social data. The adoption of such an 
approach as a method of generalisation is often questioned, since it only 
represents selected cases, and the specific cases used hold implications for the 
conclusion of the study.  Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that the case 
study chosen for the current study is not representative of all OfD engagements 
in other countries, be they in Europe, Asia or Africa, where the situation and 
results could have been different.  
Yin (2003) makes two important points in responding to critiques of the case 
study approach. First, not all qualitative studies are aimed at generalisation, but 
qualitative case studies can be important and lead to new conceptualisations. A 
case study represents a limited part of the reality, but can be very useful when 
one requires analytical simplification (Yin, 2003).  Secondly, Yin (2003:19) 
argues that “case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical 
propositions and not to populations or universes”, which means that a case study 
does not represent a ‘sample’ with the goal in mind of achieving statistical 
generalisation. Rather, the goal of a case study is to expand and to generalise 
theories (analytic generalisation; Yin, 2003).  The current study can be seen as a 
theoretical informed case study, in which theory will be used to shed new light 
on the situation.  
Moreover, Cox (1999:392) argues that approaching knowledge is complex and in 
order to:  
advance this knowledge you have to reduce the scope of your inquiry to 
the point where you can study something in its detail while being able to 
cut it off from everything else. But at the same time we must realise that it 
is only artificially cut off, and that you have to maintain also the question 
of how it links with other things to which it relates.   
Norway’s role in Angola is very complex, and limitations are obviously necessary 
in a study like the current one. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind 
that the present research is only one brick in a larger picture which one needs to 
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understand if one wishes to say anything meaningful about long-term change.  
Also of importance is the fact that one should understand the need for adopting a 
critical approach when engaging in research with another county. 
Identifying the unit of analysis can be problematic in case studies, and relates to 
everything from an individual to groups, processes and decisions (Yin, 2003). In 
single case studies, the unit of analysis and the case often refer to the same thing, 
which is determined by how the research question has been defined. The unit of 
analysis for the present study is the role that is played by Norway’s aid 
programme, OfD, in Angola.  
Babbie and Mouton (2001:282) argue that multiple sources of data are 
important in all kinds of case studies. Making use of multiple sources of evidence, 
in a so-called ‘triangulation’, adds to the reliability of research and facilitates the 
finding of accurate answers that can be confirmed by several sources.  
 
The data gathering will be split up into three sections. Firstly, data concerning 
Norway’s more historical role on the African continent will be analysed to place 
Norway within the neo-Gramscian framework as a traditional middle power. 
Secondly, literature related to the resource curse and to good governance, the 
two main theoretical topics of OfD, will be analysed. Thirdly, data related to 
Angola will be the focus of the study.  
 
The research will primarily make use of such secondary sources as official 
documents, official statements, academic analyses and literature, and other 
textual sources. Primary sources will be used where possible, supported by 
relevant literature about Norwegian foreign policy, and about the African 
political economy.  
1.6 Limits and Delimitations 
Several factors, such as time and practical constraints on the length of the study, 
have been placed on the research. Furthermore, the following analysis contains 
limitations and delimitations that are mentioned below.  
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Firstly, when analysing Norway’s role in Angola, it is problematic to define who 
represents Norway. Private investments are growing, and many of the 
commercial actors are partly owned by the Norwegian government. Statoil and 
Hydro are the largest Norwegian actors in Angola, and both of these companies 
have the government as a majority owner. Even though it would be both 
interesting and insightful to look at many actors and aspects of Norwegian 
engagement in Angola (including the non-governmental organisations [NGOs]), 
this thesis is limited to only looking at the Norwegian Government’s engagement 
through the petroleum-related aid programme OfD. As a consequence of this 
limitation, the thesis refers to the Norwegian government when talking of 
Norway.      
 
Secondly, there are limits in terms of the scope of the thesis. By engaging with 
middle power theory, which has no clear definition, there are many aspects that 
could be discussed, and that could contribute to a theoretical improvement. 
However, it is outside the scope of the thesis to contribute to such a discussion 
and theoretical development. The limitation also applies for the other theories 
used in the thesis, such as the resource curse thesis and the literature concerning 
good governance.                                                                                                                                           
 
A third limitation is in form of language. Many of the sources are in Norwegian. 
This will not pose a direct limitation on the project, since the author is fluent in 
Norwegian, but it can create a limitation for the reader who wishes to revisit the 
sources. The Norwegian government’s general information is in both English and 
Norwegian, while the official documents are mainly in the language of origin.  
A fourth limitation that is placed upon the study relates to governmental sources, 
which can be biased. Although Norwegian official sources are known for their 
high transparency, one should still be critical of them. As background material, 
sources from the Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Bergen, Norway, will be 
given much attention, and have had an influence on the thesis, since the Institute 
represents an independent research institution that has established a team that 
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focuses on Angola, that has a long-term partnership with the Angolan research 
institute Centro de studos e Investigacao Cientifica (CEIC).  
 
The current research acknowledges that Norway, as a provider of oil-related 
assistance, was present in Angola before 2005. However, the research is 
delimited to analysing Norway’s oil engagement in Angola through the OfD 
programme, despite a minimal amount of research having been undertaken into 
Norway’s engagement before that time. Another delimitation to the study is the 
fact that the thesis only considers the role that is played by OfD in Angola, 
excluding any analysis of the 24 other countries with which OfD is engaged. In 
other countries where the country context and the OfD activities differed from 
the present case study, the results of OfD’s programme can, and probably will be, 
different. 
1.7 Structure of Thesis 
The current chapter has aimed to contextualise the research, and has presented 
the background and described the methodology that will be used in the study. It 
was also argued why a critical political economy framework would serve as the 
most useful approach when presenting a critique of such an aid programme as 
the OfD and the research questions that the thesis presents.  The rest of the 
thesis will be structured as is described below. 
Chapter 2  Norway as a Middle Power in Africa 
Chapter Two will elaborate on the critical approach to middle power theory. The 
aim is to establish Norway as a traditional middle power in the global hierarchy 
by giving a historical analysis of Norway’s African foreign policy, and the 
country’s actions and presence on the continent. This will be used as a backdrop 
to the later discussion regarding Norway’s self-interest in foreign aid, as well as 
when it comes to questioning Norway’s genuine interest in creating change, 
compared with maintaining and benefiting from the status quo.   
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Chapter 3 Theorising OfD 
Chapter Three will critically analyse and engage with the theoretical foundation 
of OfD. It will, in short, present the resource curse thesis, which has gained much 
attention in mainstream petroleum-related assistance. However, rather than 
focusing on the state level, Chapter Three aims to include the global structures in 
the analysis. In critical political economy vein, it will question the over-arching 
goal of the OfD programme, namely the good governance agenda, of which the 
resource curse thesis forms part.  
Chapter 4  OfD in Angola 
Chapter Four analyses Angola and state society relations in a historical context to 
better understand who is benefiting from Norway’s state–state aid to Angola. By 
analysing Angola’s complex political economy, and identifying entry points of 
change, the chapter concludes that OfD is not contributing with support to the 
entry point that, according to literature and empiric evidence, most efficiently 
would bring change to Angola, namely civil society.    
Chapter 5  Conclusion and Final Remarks 
The final chapter will pull the previous chapters together. By using the critical 
approach from middle power theory from Chapter Two, the chapter will 
conclude that Norway is definitely fitting into the traditional middle power role, 
in accordance with which the self-interest is found on a deeper level, as chapters 
Three and Four illustrate. The chapter will touch upon contradictions in the 
Norwegian self-image and the political reality. It will summarise how a critical 
political economy approach is highly valuable and necessary when analysing 
foreign aid programmes like OfD, and how the approach offers a highly 
important perspective, which should be included in mainstream discussions 
about Norway’s presence on the African continent. The chapter will, finally, 
provide some concluding remarks, and indicate some issues for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2 
NORWAY AS A TRADITIONAL MIDDLE POWER IN AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The foreign policy of a country can be seen both as something that binds a 
country together with the rest of the world, or, just as important, as something 
that indicates a state’s uniqueness and what sets it apart from other states. In 
both cases, it makes sense to think of foreign policy as being linked to identity 
politics (NUPI, 2007:8). Norway has been able to create an image and identity, 
both domestically and internationally, as a key middle power that is a generous 
aid donor and a humanitarian superpower (Tvedt, 2003).  
Norway was situated in the middle between the opposing superpowers during 
the Cold War, both geographically and politically. After this period, but even 
more clearly after the terror attacks that were launched against the United States 
of America (USA) in 2001, Norway’s role in changing international politics has 
been much more unclear. There has been a lack of research questioning about 
what the changes imply for Norway at home, as well as about what role it should 
play abroad (NUPI, 2007). The role of Norway is expanding in the growing 
globalisation, including in Africa. In 1905, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
employed 20 people in Norway, and even fewer abroad. A century later, the 
number has increased to 1 400, and Norway has a total of 18 embassies in Africa 
alone, with some 300 employees.   
Within this context, the overarching aim of the current chapter is to elaborate on 
how Norway has played a role as a traditional middle power in Africa. Critical 
theory will be used to demonstrate that Norway’s role as a traditional middle 
power – through which the country seeks to export an altruistic perception of a 
‘do-good image’ – is underpinned by a deeper national self-interest. The present 
chapter firstly provides an overview of how the literature around middle power 
theory has developed. The overview is followed by a discussion related to the 
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critical approach to middle powers, and an understanding of the neo-Gramscian 
notion of hegemony. The discussion provides a backdrop to understanding a 
critical analysis of the global structures and world order, and the role of middle 
powers in the system, and will also facilitate further analysis in the thesis.   
The last part of the chapter focuses on Norway as a traditional middle power in 
Africa. By illustrating how the country fits into the critical understanding of a 
traditional middle power, Norway’s approach towards the African continent will 
be analysed in the light of three overarching themes: multilateralism; the 
country’s role as a peace promoter; and, last but not least, aid, which will be the 
focus in the rest of the thesis.  
2.2 Middle Power Theory in International Relations 
Until the end of the Cold War, the dominant neo-realist theorists had largely 
focused on the role played by the major powers and hegemonic order. However, 
the powers could not exist in a vacuum, requiring the remaining states, with 
diversified power status, to support the former powers. The remaining countries 
were classified as middle or medium powers5 (Jordaan, 2003). Classifying 
countries according to power capabilities is grounded in tradition going back to 
the times of Thomas Aquinas and the archbishop of Milan, Giovanni Botero, who 
was the first to use the notion of middle or medium power in the 16th century 
(Holbraad, 1984; Ravenhill, 1998:309). Even though the term has been in use for 
centuries, it became popularised when Canada asserted its middle power status 
during the latter stage of the Second World War. In the planning of what would 
become the United Nations (UN), Canada asserted that “power and responsibility 
went together and that post-war arrangements should reflect the stake and 
potential contribution of ‘medium powers’” (Wood, 1990:78). In making such an 
assertion, Canada wanted to ensure that the middle powers had its special rights 
respected in terms of the non-permanent seats on the Security Council.   
 
While identifying superpowers or major powers has remained relatively 
                                                        
5 The terminology can vary: middle powers–medium powers, middlepowermanship, 
middlepowerhood, etc. The current thesis will make use of the terms ‘middle power’ and 
‘middlepowermanship’.   
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unproblematic, attempting to pinpoint middle power countries, in contrast, has 
been shown to be highly problematic and ambiguous (Ravenhill, 1998; Taylor, 
2001). Different scholars use different characteristics and variables to define a 
country as a middle power. With no unified definition of the term, states that 
share some of the middle power characteristics, such as interest in 
multilateralism and peacekeeping, or states of medium size, can claim the title, 
making the concept vague (Chapnic, 1999:73).  In the 1990s, the term broadened 
even further when new and emerging states were included in the terminology, 
and attention was drawn to alternative sources of agency in the global order, 
including non-state-centric views (see Cooper, 1997; Jordaan, 2003). 
 
A review of the literature suggests two broad distinctions in the thinking of 
scholars defining middle powers. The first approach focuses on the states’ 
material capability6, while the other emphasises behaviour in IPE (Taylor, 
2001:19)7. Both approaches can be seen as being politically motivated, with 
states using the middle power label to increase their state power. Both 
approaches are briefly outlined below prior to an elaboration of the critical 
approach.  
 
Pratt (1990:3) argues that realism rules supreme in the inner councils of the 
foreign ministries of most Western states, with the material capability approach 
often being linked to the state-centric, realist view (see also Cooper, 1997; Cox, 
1996:827; Jordaan, 2003:166; Taylor, 2001). Carsten Holbraad (1984) focuses 
on geopolitical criteria as military capabilities and forces when identifying 
middle powers, noting that middle powers are largely dependent on stronger 
states. Different criteria are used when ranking countries in the international 
system, varying from Holbraad’s measurements of military capabilities to such 
economic indicators as the gross domestic product (GDP) (Wood, 1990), as well 
as to other factors, like population size and geographical location.  
 
                                                        
6    Also referred to as the aggregate approach. 
7 Chapnick (1999) builds on three approaches: the functional, behavioural and 
hierarchical model. However, such categorisation is not elaborated on in the current 
thesis.  
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The large variety of measurements makes the approach controversial. In many 
ways, it limits the approach to distinguishing middle powers from superpowers. 
However, such measurements become rather problematic when setting the 
middle powers apart from those that are smaller (Van der Westhuizen, 1998; 
Wood, 1990). By pursuing a realistic approach that focuses on maximising 
influence and power, the approach can be useful when explaining the interest of 
middle powers. However, such an approach also points to the material 
constraints that middle powers face when they oppose the greater powers. 
Further, a limitation of the current thesis is the realist state-centric approach 
that emphasises great power agency and which focuses less on the ability of 
middle powers to manipulate international affairs. In a realistic vein, it has even 
been argued that middle powers can be discounted as having any importance at 
all.8  Higgott and Nossal (1997:35) address the problem by exemplifying the neo-
realist approach, quoting Kenneth Waltz’s statement “Denmark doesn’t matter”, 
and Krasner’s argument: “Sure people in Luxembourg have good ideas, but who 
gives a damn. Luxembourg ain’t hegemonic.”  
 
The second approach bases the definition of middle power on the states’ foreign 
policy behaviour, and is linked to the liberal vein of argument. Cooper, Higgott 
and Nossal (1993) illustrate that middle powers and institutions do matter and 
can play an important role in the international system. Their identification of 
Canada and Australia as middle powers deliberately avoids using the physical 
attributes that the material approach builds on in their definition, resulting in a 
framework that is able not only to distinguish middle powers from greater 
powers, but also from smaller powers (Ravenhill, 1998:310).  
 
By highlighting the danger of taking agency away from the analytical framework, 
the three above-mentioned scholars help to link foreign policy to ‘national 
interests’, and to demonstrate that power and interest cannot be ignored. Due to 
their position in the global economy, and their limited capacity to contribute to, 
and operate right across, the policy spectrum, middle powers define their 
priorities, identify areas of comparative advantage, and direct their resources 
                                                        
8 For a deeper description of the limitations of this approach, see Taylor (2001).  
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towards them – leading to what Cooper calls ‘niche diplomacy’ (Alden and Vieira, 
2005; Cooper, 1997). Higgott and Nossal (1997) illustrate how the middle 
powers adopt different methods of doing the above, depending on their 
comparative advantage and on the area from which they stand to gain the most 
political benefit and desired results. The approach highlights the importance of 
agency when defining the foreign policy of middle powers and analysing their 
behaviour. Even those middle powers that are grouped together have different 
strengths on which they build in terms of their foreign policy strategy (Higgott 
and Nossal, 1997; Jordaan, 2003:173).  
 
While the first approach mentioned might indicate that states need the 
appropriate material ability to be a middle power, the second approach 
highlights that the country must act like a middle power, and be willing to take 
on such a role. The way in which they identify how they pursue their foreign 
policy goals distinguishes them from the greater or smaller powers.9 According 
to Chapnic (1999:75), the behavioural approach is the most favoured model in 
middle-power literature. However, in spite of its popularity, the approach fails to 
reach an objective and common definition, and the behavioural characteristics 
noted tend to vary between scholars.   
2.2.1 Critical Middle Power Theory 
The lack of a common definition indicates that there are many pitfalls to be 
avoided when theorising about middle powers. While the realist approach 
focuses on state capacity, and the liberal approach focuses on state behaviour, 
the critical approach to recognising constitutive and material capability features 
when identifying middle powers is the international system. At the same time, 
the approach entrenches the importance of agency for individual states, and 
embeds behavioural features into the theoretical framework. Cooper (1997) 
points to the work of Robert Cox (1983) on middlepowermanship as providing 
an alternative approach that avoids many of the common pitfalls when 
conceptualising middle powers.  
                                                        
9 See Cooper et al. (1997) for an extensive overview of the liberal behavioural approach.  
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The argument in this thesis is that the critical approach to middle power theory 
contributes with the most useful analytical framework due to its multi-level 
historical approach that embeds both constitutive and behavioural features. 
While the more traditional theories seek “to facilitate the smooth working of 
existing social and political arrangements”, critical theory, in contrast, does not 
accept the status quo, rather seeking to challenge the “ideologically frozen 
relations of dependence” that sustains status quo (Neufeld, 1995:10).   
To understand and make use of Robert Cox’s (1983) concept of 
middlepowermanship, one needs to see this as a role rather than as merely a way 
of categorising states. Cox (1996:244) argues that “middle power is a role in 
search of an actor”, in terms of which the ability to act like a middle power (in 
material capability terms) is required, combined with the willingness to act out 
such a role (behavioural term). Much of the literature concerning middle powers 
was written in an era of bipolarity in the international system.  Cox (1987:242) 
aims to show that the middle power concept was just as useful after the Cold 
War as it was during it. He builds his theory around a world order as a historical 
process and the states’ positions within the hierarchy must always be rethought 
in the context of the changing international system, as well as when there is an 
absence of hegemon. Whereas the middle powers had created a position for 
themselves as ‘bridge-builders’ between the two superpower blocks during the 
Cold War, they now aim to be the link between the North and the South.  
Middlepowermanship, in the behavioural vein, denotes a style of foreign policy 
behaviour that is practised by states that are neither great nor small. However, 
middlepowermanship has nothing to do with size, but rather defines a 
conception of a country’s role in the world, referring to the initiative and 
restraints of a country with middle-power status (Cox, 1992). According to 
Taylor (2001), such a way of combining states’ capability and their diplomatic 
behaviour provides a more useful definition of the nature of middle powers, as 
well as showing a greater understanding of the role that states play.  
Van der Westhuizen (1998:437) points out the tendency within orthodox or 
idealist conceptualisations of middlepowermanship to  see the states as having a 
 21 
higher moral ground, and as being more ‘trustworthy’ and acting as ‘good 
international citizens’. Their involvement in peace efforts, international 
cooperation and consensus-building activities underpin such an image. However, 
in more critical vain, Black (1997:103) argues that “middle powers are not 
simply middle powers because of their tendency to involve themselves in peace 
negotiations, or because they are active in multilateralism. It is rather their long-
term interest vis-a-vis world order, the world economy and the dominant societal 
values and interest, all supported by significant material/technical/bureaucratic 
capabilities, to do so” (Black, 1997:103). 
The numerous attempts that have been made to construct a common framework 
for defining the middle power concept in which the old and classical countries, as 
well as the rising and new middle powers are embedded, have the potential to 
make the literature more confusing, instead of to clarify the debates. Holbraad’s 
(1984) attempt to divide the middle powers into an  ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ group is 
limited by many of the same reasons as the materialist capabilities approach, and 
has been seen as problematic (Taylor, 2001). However, the work of Jordaan 
(2003) has received recognition for its distinguishing between traditional middle 
powers and emerging middle powers. The traditional middle powers emerged 
after the Second World War, and have established themselves as wealthy, stable, 
social democracies in the developed Northern hemisphere (Jordaan, 2003). 
Emerging middle powers, in contrast, rose after the Cold War when the global 
environment changed and the role and functions of the middle powers changed. 
As the name implies, such middle powers are emerging and still semi-peripheral, 
and are not core countries like the traditional middle powers (Jordaan, 2003). 
Moreover, the emerging middle powers are newly democratised, and are 
situated in the South. The emerging middle powers are often countries with a 
deep social cleavage, in terms of class (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa) or 
ethnicity (e.g. Nigeria, Malaysia, and South Africa), whereas the traditional 
middle powers represent some of the most industrialised and egalitarian 
countries in the world, ranking in the top list of the Human Development Index 
(e.g. Norway, Sweden, and Canada;) (Jordaan, 2003:171, 172).   
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By broadening the concept of what amounts to a middle power, Jordaan’s aim is 
to reduce the vagueness of the middle power concept and to give it greater 
analytical clarity (Jordaan, 2003). Both terms (i.e. ‘traditional’ and ‘emerging’) 
refer to the countries’ position in the global system as middle powers, with the 
distinction being made due to the different nature of the roles of the countries. In 
the critical vein, and building on the thinking of Robert Cox, Jordaan’s 
(2003:165) typology offers a framework in which traditional and emerging 
middle powers can be distinguished in terms of their mutually influencing 
constitutive and behavioural differences. The internationalism of middle powers 
can be identified by locating them within the global political economy and by 
identifying their role and interest in the neo-liberal hegemonic project (Jordaan, 
2003). Such a process is elaborated on throughout the current thesis.  
While both Cox and Jordaan also emphasise the importance of the constitutive 
features by which middle powers can be recognised, the critical approach 
provides an account of what middle powers do in the international system and 
what purpose they are thought to serve. Largely, the behavioural characteristics 
of middle powers link them to the supporters and stabilisers of the hegemonic 
world order, due to their lack of capacity to bring about deeper global change 
alone. Chapnic (1999:75) argues that the notion of multilateralism, conflict 
management and moral power in terms of aid are key elements in the 
behavioural literature. The elements will be elaborated on later in this chapter.  
Multilateralism is actually a behavioural aspect that seems to be a characteristic 
upon which most scholars who abide by middle power theory agree.10 Cox, in his 
1996 article on middlepowermanship, largely focuses on multilateralism.   
According to Van der Westhuizen (1998), the middle powers in the aftermath of 
the Second World War directed their attention to multilateral channels in the 
bipolar international system, in order to help forestall direct superpower 
confrontation. Multilateral forums became the natural arena for the middle 
powers, even though multilateralism should not be seen as an alternative to 
great power politics. Alden and Vieira (2005:1079) argue that “(w)hat is 
                                                        
10 Whereas other scholars argue that middle powers support the world order, Cox 
(1987) goes further and talks of a specific world order: the Pax Americana.  
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important about middle powers is that they are situated ideologically and 
materially within the dominant hegemonic paradigm but are limited (by both 
power and disposition) in their capacity to act”.  
As middle powers are situated both ideologically and materially within the 
dominant US-led world order, they can only use their status to respond to their 
relative power status, and not fundamentally to challenge the order. Rather, 
“true to their conflict-management proclivities, middle powers assist in making 
the ideology, values and practices of the hegemonic order that facilitate and 
mask global inequality appear more natural and universal” (Jordaan, 2003:169). 
Middle powers also act as legitimisers of the same world order, due to their 
privileged position in the global political economy from which they benefit in 
terms of “the institutionalisation of (and the inequality associated with) the 
current neo-liberal hegemony” (Jordaan, 2003:169).   
Thus, recognising that defining middle powers is seen as highly problematic, it is 
outside the scope of the current research to contribute to the discussion 
concerning a unified concept of middle powers. Rather, the present thesis aims 
to illustrate how a critical approach can contribute to understanding Norway’s 
role as a middle power in the political economy and its engagement on the 
African continent. More specifically, a contribution can be made in terms of the 
usefulness of the theoretical framework for elaborating on Norway’s role in 
Angola. By taking the national interest into account, and by not ignoring power 
and interest, the analytical framework will be specially useful in the thesis, since 
the framework provides an effective counter to the idealist-inspired myth of 
Norwegian ‘exceptionalism’ in foreign policy practice.  
 
However, to comprehend the critical understanding of middlepowermanship, it 
is important to elaborate on how the approach understands the world order and 
the role that middle powers play in the order. Such an elaboration is provided in 
the following section, before expounding on Norway’s engagement on the 
African continent after the Second World War. The findings will be used as a 
backdrop to use of the theoretical framework for exploring Norway’s role as a 
middle power in Angola.     
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2.2.2 Conceptualising the Global Context and Hegemony 
Antonio Gramsci’s writings on how to create an alternative state and society, 
based on a working class, and his understanding of hegemony, have proven to be 
a very useful tool in international relations, even though Gramsci himself never 
engaged directly with the field (Cox, 1983). The neo-Gramscian approach to 
hegemony “assumes a capitalist world economy in which relations between 
classes is a key explanatory variable. The role and activities of social structures, 
from firms to states to international organizations, are understood in terms of 
class relations” (Neufeld, 1995:13).  
 
Gramsci saw hegemony as “universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which 
lay down general rules for behaviour for states and for those forces of civil 
society that act across national boundaries, rules which support the dominant 
mode of production” (Cox, 1983:137). Cox developed the notion of hegemony 
further from a subnational level to also apply within the world orders, arguing 
that there is a consensus between states, which is manifested in the acceptance 
of ideas, material capabilities and institutions in a state. This order can be 
anticipated outwards on a global scale (Cox, 1983). Although hegemony is a form 
of dominance, such dominance not only relies on force, but rather on shared 
values and a shared notion, in terms of which the hegemon is able to shape the 
reality of other actors and states (Cox, 1983). According to Cox, a hegemonic 
world order is a historically determined period during which a major power 
establishes its domination through the consent of other states, finding that order 
compatible with their own interests (Cox, 1987). To gain an understanding of 
Cox’s notion of hegemony to its full extent, it is worth quoting Cox at length: 
Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order among 
states. It is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of 
production which penetrates into all countries and links into other 
subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of international 
social relationships which connect the social classes of the different 
countries. World hegemony is describable as a social structure, an 
economic structure, and a political structure; and it cannot be simply one 
of these things but must be all three. World hegemony, furthermore, is 
expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay 
down general rules of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil 
society that act across national boundaries – rules which support the 
dominant mode of production.  
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(Cox, 1983) 
 
Neufeld (1995:14) explains Gramsci’s hegemonic world order as implying a link 
between the international levels that are interconnected with hegemonic 
relations within civil societies in core states. To regulate this world order, the 
hegemon is able to establish norms and institutions to underpin their position. 
“Significantly, these norms and institutions are not identified with the narrow 
interests of specific states or social classes, but rather take on a semblance of 
universality and, therewith, an aura of legitimacy” (Neufeld, 1995:14). 
 
Robert Cox’s concept of world order refers to the distribution of power on a 
global scale. Cox elaborates on Gramsci’s ideas about hegemony and civil society, 
applying it to IPE and to the global level. In Cox’s description of Pax Americana, 
US hegemony after the Second World War, which is aimed at putting into place a 
new world order in which many of the Western states transformed their state 
structure (with the Marshall Plan contributed by the US) to commit to the new 
order based on trade liberalisation, on exchange convertibility and on basic 
conditions that would lead to a more open economy (Cox, 1987). According to 
Cox (1981), most of the international organisations were created with the means 
to support, to stabilise and to perpetuate the particular order in which the US 
were aiming to expand into new markets. One example is the Bretton Wood 
institutions, which were created to strengthen the structures that the US created, 
and in terms of which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank are often described as accessories to the US hegemon. Structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the Bretton Wood institutions became 
America’s best tool for spreading the neo-liberal project to the Third World by 
creating dependent development. It is within this system that Cox elaborates on 
the middle powers’ role and interest in supporting the existing world order, 
whether this is in the context of a hegemonic order, or in the absence of a 
hegemon (Cox, 1983).  
Traditional middle powers are ideologically and materially situated within the 
dominant hegemonic paradigm, where their capacity to act is limited. They 
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promote the idea where they, as key middle powers, can act as bridge-builders 
between the North and the South, or the two ideological blocs during the Cold 
War. Alden and Vieira (2005) criticise the core literature concerning middle 
powers, arguing that it derived from a materialist account, written from the 
proverbial core, in terms of which multilateral institutions reflect the interest of 
the core countries. Traditional middle powers aim to maximise desirable 
outcomes through international organisations and multilateralism. By using 
their position to attain key positions within the decision-making hierarchies, 
which are led by the dominant hegemon, such powers justify their position as 
bridge-builders by promoting activism in the name of equality (Alden and Vieira, 
2005; Cox, 1996; Van der Westhuizen, 1998). However, Alden and Vieira 
(2005:1079) argue:  
in a substantive way, they are wedded to the ideological paradigm of 
neoliberalism that infuses the outlook and programming of these 
institutions and, through the systemic bias inherent in selection …, owe 
their very position within the institutional hierarchy to a tacit acceptance 
of structural inequalities in the international system.  
 
Although middle powers are neither great, nor small, when it comes to 
international power, capacity or influence, they demonstrate the propensity to 
promote cohesion and stability in the world system (Jordaan, 2003:165).  
Multilateralism is definitely a tool that is used to maintain such cohesion and 
stability, as well as for taking care of the national interest of the traditional 
middle powers. However, in this system they develop such policy instruments as 
mediation and peacekeeping to maintain this order, and promote the idea that 
they are ‘bridge-builders’ between the dominant power and ‘the others’, 
embracing the notions of being ‘good international citizens’ (Alden and Vieira, 
2005; Van der Westhuizen, 1998:439). 
This thesis recognises the usefulness of Jordaan’s critical framework concerning 
middle powers and the focus on states in “the global political economy and elite 
complicity in the neo-liberal project as explanatory variables” (Jordaan, 
2003:167). The last part of the chapter assesses Norway’s engagement with the 
African continent in the light of the country’s role as a traditional middle power, 
with a focus on multilateralism, on contributions concerning peace, and on aid. 
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By contextualising the Norwegian position in the global political economy, the 
role that national self-interest plays in global stability, controllability, and 
predictability will become more visible. Norway’s role and interest in what 
Jordaan (2003:167) describes as “perpetuating the status quo, entrenching (and 
exacerbating) existing inequalities in power and wealth to their relative benefit” 
will, thus, be shown.     
2.3 Norway as a Traditional Middle Power in Africa 
Jordaan (2003:165) argues that “ d espite problems of classification, a consensus 
has developed that states such as Australia, Canada, Norway and Sweden are 
middle powers”. Moreover, in terms of Jordaan’s differentiation, Norway can be 
characterised as a traditional middle power. 
 
After having been a part of the Kalmar Union for 436 years, as well as part of the 
Danish Monarchy, Norway was ceded to the King of Sweden in 1814 when 
Denmark lost in the Napoleonic wars. Norway used the opportunity to declare its 
independence, and agreed to enter into a union with Sweden. Norway developed 
a liberal constitution and independent institutions, apart from the Foreign 
Service. The arrangement continued until 1905, when Norway was peacefully 
declared independent from neighbouring Sweden. This generated an 
opportunity for Norway to create an autonomous foreign policy.  The main aim 
in this policy-making was that the country could remain neutral so as to ensure 
access to vital international trade(NUPI, 2007:7). A century later, the situation 
has changed significantly. Norway was, until the second half of the 20th century, 
a poor country compared with many other European countries. However, during 
the Cold War, Norway developed into a social democratic welfare state and a 
stable social democracy, which today is ranked at the top of UN’s human 
development index. 
 
As Norway was never a colonial power, the first interaction with the African 
continent came in the form of Christian missionaries in the 1840s, who 
embarked on efforts in South Africa, and later in Tanzania, Madagascar, Mali and 
Ethiopia (Tostensen, 2002).  In addition, Norway’s long tradition of whale 
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hunting and commercial shipping expanded the Norwegian access to ports along 
the African coast. Naval trade and Christian missionaries became the most 
prominent elements influencing the Norwegian policies that were adopted 
towards the continent before the Second World War (Tostensen, 2002).  
2.3.1 Norway’s Relations with Africa through Multilateral Channels 
Norway’s foreign policy developed in the context of the American-led hegemonic 
order. Norway, as a core country, has enjoyed clear benefits in its association 
with American dominance in the global order and its efforts towards 
liberalisation in trade and investment regimes.  Domestically, the system did not 
only benefit a top elite, but it also contributed to the development of the welfare 
state. Internationally, Norway’s middlepowermanship was directed towards 
supporting such multilateral organisations as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), the UN, and the Bretton Wood institutions. As a traditional 
middle power, Norway has strong traditions as an active multilateralist. In 
relation to Norway’s relations with Africa, Tostensen (2002) argues that most 
official policies and political stands toward, as well as aid granted to, Africa took 
the form of contributions that were made to such international institutions as the 
UN. Confirming Norway’s commitment to the UN, the Foreign Minister, Jonas 
Gahr Støre, proudly calls Norway the organisation’s best friend (NUPI, 2007:20). 
 
Multilateralism is seen as the natural forum for middle powers, but one should 
not forget why these organisations were created, and by whom. Alden and Vieira 
(2005) argue that, while classical middle powers that are already situated within 
the formal (IMF and the World Bank) and informal (G7 and G8) institutional 
framework, benefit from their involvement in the system, other emerging middle 
powers experience such a situation as being more problematic. The traditional 
middle powers are ambivalent when it comes to the acceptance of the 
reconstruction of existing systems, since doing so can challenge their situation, 
their power status and the status quo.   
The creation of Norway’s foreign policy has taken place in an environment that is 
subject to a changing world order, with the policy largely being dependent on 
other actors. External actors and factors have influenced the creation and 
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development of Norwegian foreign policy, with Norway having benefited from, 
and having had a great interest in, the creation of international organisations and 
institutions, which have aimed to stabilise the existing world order and to 
restore peace. Tostensen (2002) argues that the contributions of aid that are 
made through the multilateral institutions “are an expansion of the importance 
attached to multilateral solutions in the overall foreign policy”, which highlights 
the importance of “small countries like Norway’s dependence to seek protection 
under multilateral organizations”.  
While emerging middle powers have a semi-peripheral status, traditional middle 
powers hold a core position in the global economy. Historically, Norway’s foreign 
policy has been preoccupied with a dependency on other larger powers, such as 
the US, and, hence, vulnerability to the international system. Norway has sought 
to maximise its influence and to protect its interest through multilateral ties in 
such hegemonic forums as the UN, NATO and the European Economic 
Community (EEC), while its diplomacy has been flexible and addressed towards 
issues where such intervention has been beneficial.  Pratt (1990) argues that 
‘classical middle powers’ use their position to attain key roles within large 
institutions like the UN. They make themselves important, based on their 
activism, since they are neither strong military nor strong economic powers.  
Norway has, through the UN, had an active role to play in supporting the 
sanctions that were adopted towards, for example, apartheid South Africa and 
South West Africa (present-day Namibia), as well as towards Southern Rhodesia 
(present-day Zimbabwe). As a member of the UN Security Council in 2002, 
Norway was more actively able to help put Africa on the agenda (Tostensen, 
2002).  To strengthen the possibility of finding African solutions to African 
challenges, Norway, as part of the UN Security Council, stressed the importance 
of supporting African organisations. Regional and subregional support was 
emphasised in conflict management conducted through the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Tostensen, 2002).  
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A more aggressive attempt to put the South on the agenda in a multilateral forum 
involved the mobilising of a larger group of Western middle powers in the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) negotiations in the 1970s than had 
previously existed (Pratt, 1990:18). The initiative was led by ministers from 
Norway and the Netherlands, in an effort to promote international reforms, in a 
multilateral forum, in which development of the Third World was put forward as 
the overarching goal. Even though the attempt failed in many ways, it is 
important to recognise Norway’s sympathy with the countries in the South (the 
G77 group), during this period in the struggle between the North and the South, 
in the form of contributions that were made to multilateral forums, and how 
Norway used its position as a middle power in the project (Pratt, 1990).  
The critical approach argues that the above-mentioned countries are wedded to 
the neo-liberal paradigm, and benefit from their position within it, so that they 
do not crucially challenge the underlying structures of the international system. 
Rather, they construct the idea of being ‘bridge-builders’, both during the Cold 
War and during the North/South divide, in terms of which one finds a tacit 
acceptance of structural inequalities.  
 
Black (1997) elaborates on the point that many of the middle powers also 
supported the norms and institutions involved in the creation of the Bretton 
Wood Institutions after the Second World War, as a part of the US neo-liberal 
project. Norway, being part of the dominant class in the West and an emerging 
welfare state at this point, had large interests in a relatively open trading system 
(Van der Westhuizen, 1998:439).  The structural self-interest behind the 
activism and support of multilateral institutions should not be underestimated 
behind the good international citizen image.   
2.3.2 A Promoter of Peace on the African Continent 
As a middle power, Norway aims to direct its attention towards those domains 
where it has a high degree of resources and reputational qualifications. Jan 
Egeland (cited in Tostensen, 2002) argues that a total sum of historical factors 
concerning Norway adds up to a comparative advantage, which gives Norway 
moral authority. Some such factors, such as the lack of a colonial past, having a 
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good image as a supporter of decolonisation, being a major contributor to and 
supporter of the UN, the large proportion of GDP that is directed towards aid, 
and the long traditions of human rights’ advocacy, have played an important role 
in creating the Norwegian self-image as an important peace-loving nation. The 
image has gained prominence, with, after the Cold War, the Norwegian self-
image as a peace-loving nation being expanded to include new political areas, 
with most of the policies that Norway directed towards the Third World falling 
into the terminology related to the peace efforts (NUPI, 2007:12).  
 
While Norwegians tend to see its engagement with peace as being part of its 
‘good international citizens’ role, neo-Gramscian middle power theory aims to 
identify the self-interest that is involved with such peace. Cox  (1987:244) argues 
that “middle power is likely to be in the middle rank of material capabilities, but 
it also stands in the middle in situations of conflict. It seeks to expand the area of 
common ground which will make it possible to curtail risk in the management of 
conflict”. Norway has, and is still, playing a supportive role in the hegemonic 
global order in several critical senses, one being the role that it has played as a 
mediator and facilitator to avoid or to solve conflicts in order to secure stability 
and global order. Norway has a long history of acting as a negotiator in conflicts 
around the world. The most profiled was the role that Norway played in the 
Middle East, where Øyvind Østerud (1997) argues that Norway used its niche as 
a neutral actor without self-interest in the negotiations concerned with the 
Palestine–Israel conflict, leading to the well-known and much-disputed Oslo 
process.  
 
While Norway’s engagements in the conflicts in Sri Lanka and Colombia, and its 
negotiation role in the civil war in Guatemala are highly profiled, the Norwegian 
engagement in conflict resolution in Africa has received less attention. Norway’s 
strategy of playing the role of an organiser, initiative-taker and driving-force, 
rather than a direct negotiator, has played a crucial role in the peace process in 
Southern Sudan under IGAD, as organiser and financial contributor to the 
Burundi negotiations, as driving force in the dialogue between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia in 2000, and, just recently, with its representation at the peace 
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negotiation table in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  
 
Neufeld (1995:23) argues that the policy circles’ focus on peace and 
peacekeeping “can be seen as a strategy to appeal to public sentiment while 
dampening expectations for progressive actions”. He continues by explaining 
that this focus appeals to the majority of the country’s citizens, who for their 
country to play a progressive role, as a middle power, in the international arena.  
In contrast, it also serves as a justification for high levels of military spending.11 
In the global order, the Norwegian peace contributions can be seen as serving a 
larger agenda, by maintaining stability in the hegemonic, or, perhaps more 
importantly, in the non-hegemonic world order.   
 
On the notion of national self-interest, one should not underestimate Norway’s 
interest in, and engagement with, peace efforts. In respect of other powers in 
adjacent regions, conflict can have direct implications for foreign policy and 
national interest, but as Norway (and the world) becomes more globalised, the 
concern with peace broadens.12 For Norway, as for many other middle powers, 
human rights have held a central place in foreign policy, including that which has 
been adopted towards Africa. In the 1990s, Norway’s diplomatic rupture with 
Kenya was blamed on human rights issues (Tostensen, 2002). In May 2009, 
Norway was elected as a member of the UN Human Rights Council, in connection 
with which Norwegian diplomats have made it clear that they aim to make a 
difference and to continue to support those who seek to defend human right s. 
2.3.3 Norway as an Aid Donor 
Norway’s first aid contribution and political stand towards the South was 
conducted through the UN in the late 1940s when aid to less fortunate countries 
                                                        
11 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) illustrates in their new 
study (World Military Expenditure, 1988–2008), that only six other countries in the 
world (Israel, the USA, Kuwait, Oman, Singapore and Saudi Arabia) spend more money 
on their military per capital than does Norway.  
12 See Higgott and Nossal (1997:27) regarding how globalisation has resulted in a new 
architecture of power evolving structural power from finance, production, and the 
exchange of technical expertise in the world market, resulting in what Susan Strange has 
called ‘new diplomacy’. In the current globalised world, social changes have become a 
global phenomenon that needs to be understood on a global scale.   
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in the southern hemisphere was placed on the UN agenda (see NUPI, 2007; Pratt, 
1990; Tostensen, 2002; Tvedt, 2003). Norway was still a small power recovering 
from the Second World War as a part of the Marshall Plan to Europe when the 
first bilateral cooperation started in 1952 in the form of a fishing project in India. 
Norway was then in its last phase of the Marshall Plan, with the aid budget 
during the first decade being relatively small, only representing one-twentieth of 
what Norway itself had received in aid after the Second World War (NUPI, 
2007:18).   
 
In 1963, the governmental aid relation was expanded to Africa. Tanzania became 
the first partner, and has been, until today, the largest receiver of Norwegian 
foreign aid (Report to the Storting, no. 13, 2008–2009).  To avoid the aid 
fluctuating with political vagaries, the Foreign Ministry established the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) in 1968 as a separate 
administrative directory. Norad’s aim was to ensure that the aid was given in the 
form of long-term relationship in the form of grants and not loans, so that 
Norway could build up its levels of sustainable development (Tostensen, 2002).  
 
In the period between 1960 and 1975, a significant change occurred in the 
Norwegian political attitude towards Southern Africa (Eriksen, 2000:9). 
Although trade and investment relations remained small, in the 1960s both the 
Norwegian official authorities and solidarity movements engaged in the 
liberation struggle, with a special focus on the Portuguese colonies and the anti-
apartheid struggle (Eriksen, 2000).  The close relationship to the liberation 
struggles in southern Africa was turned into a more regulated relationship when 
Norad was established in 1968, and the Labour Party decided to make the 
assistance to the liberation movements a priority in Norwegian aid (Eriksen, 
2000:75), on which Chapter Four will elaborate. 
 
More than any contemporary relationship, aid has become the most 
predominant relationship with Africa and has had a determining influence on 
Norway’s Africa policy (Tostensen, 2002). From the 1960s until today, this 
relationship has played an important role in shaping the Norwegian self-image 
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as a humanitarian superpower (see Tvedt, 2003). Norwegians tend to see their 
willingness to give as being a direct expression of ‘goodness’, and the focus 
among Norwegians has been on how much is given in terms of percentage of the 
GDP. More fundamental and complex questions regarding the consequences of 
the aid, and how it has been donated, have received less attention and discussion 
(NUPI, 2007:17).  
 
During the last decades, Norway has been among the countries in the world that 
has given the largest proportion (approximately 1%) of their GDP to 
development aid, underpinning the image of being a ‘good international citizen’. 
The self-image can be explained as an extension of the deeply entrenched 
welfare and humanist values that underpin domestic redistributive policies in 
Norwegian society. Jordaan (2003:174) explains this as a “transposition of 
domestic approaches to economic justice and equality to the international 
sphere”.  The motivation behind this aid, Jordaan argues, is often more 
hegemonically induced than may appear on the surface (Jordaan, 2003:175). 
According to Jordaan (2003:175) “foreign aid has the effect of appeasing and 
averting demands for fundamental change in the global economy, working on a 
similar principle as the extension of the welfare state to poorer classes to 
dissipate revolt from below in a national setting.” In this view, one finds the 
motivation behind the foreign aid as being on a deeper level, and sees it as a way 
of managing endemic instability in the world order.  
2.4 Norway’s New Face in Africa  
When concluding the current chapter, the difficulties and challenges with 
categorising and generalising about middle powers must be emphasised. The 
ending note will, therefore, refer to Robert Cox’s point, which sees the evolving 
nature of middle power diplomacy as a dynamic of the historical process, linked 
to the development of international organisations (Cooper, 1997:8).  The role of 
middle powers should not be seen as fixed, but rather as something that 
continually must be rethought within the changing international system (Cox, 
1996). Another important point to have in mind when theorising about middle 
powers, regardless of theoretical approach, is to make space for agency for the 
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individual country (Black, 1997; Jordaan, 2003). It is important to ask the 
question why middle powers seem to be such good global citizens. One should 
not underestimate the benefits of peace and stability – in the region or on the 
international arena – for the middle powers.  
With the African continent having received little attention in Norway’s first 
hundred years of foreign policy, one now sees a change. In 2007, the Foreign 
Ministry published the Platform For an Integrated African Policy to fill the lack of 
a coherent approach to the continent. However, such a publication raises new 
issues in terms of which questions like who represents Norway become vital. The 
debate concerning national self-interest in aid is relatively new in Norway, but 
the self-interest itself has been consistently present in a number of ways. 
Between 1965 and 1975 as much as 30 per cent of the aid budget was granted to 
Norwegian commodity suppliers, with, in total, more than half of the aid 
coveringed Norwegian salaries and deliveries (NUPI, 2007: 18).Terje Tvedt 
points to the fact that one needs to look at domestic issues and interests to 
understand how the foreign policy of Norway has developed. Tvedt finds that the 
boundaries between domestic and foreign policy diminish and the foreign policy 
is also reflecting national interests in Norway, as in any other country (Tvedt, 
2003: 7).  
While the governmental aid and bilateral engagement with Africa are increasing, 
the commercial actors (private and partly-government owned) are exploring the 
continent.  Statoil and Hydro are the largest Norwegian investors on the 
continent, and, in many countries the companies represent the most visible sign 
of Norway’s presence in Africa. Since the government owns the largest share in 
the companies, the role of the Norwegian government can be perceived as 
blurred and even conflicting at times.  The debate, which will not receive much 
attention in this thesis, will be referred to only in terms of the larger picture of 
the complex reality.  
 
In expansion on the African continent, the investments are increasing and 
Norwegian companies and the government are earning big money. According to 
Hanssen (2008a), Africa represents the largest investment area outside Europe 
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today, and Angola is already representing the largest oil investment country 
outside Norway. Angola represents the largest receiver of Norwegian 
investments and is a key aid receiver. Statoil and Hydro have been in Angola 
since 1993 – during the Angolan civil war – and by the end of 2006 the total 
investments added up to NOK 40bn in oil alone (Hanssen, 2008b). The 
Norwegian presence in Angola seems only to have increased. Hydro and the 
Angolan government are planning to open an aluminium industrial unit in 
Angola, which is an investment that will represent the largest Norwegian 
investment that has been made on the African continent ever, with the amount 
exceeding the total sum of aid that has been given to Tanzania since 1963 
(Hanssen, 2008b). All of the new relationships have implications for Norway’s 
role on the African continent. 
Chapter Two has illustrated the usefulness of the critical framework for locating 
the national interest and benefits with regard to Norway’s position in the global 
political economy and its role on the African continent.   With a multiple-level 
analysis, the critical framework allows for an analysis in which the national 
interest of countries can be found on a deeper level, at the same time as it allows 
seeing this in structural perspective, in terms of which one can also identify 
Norway as a ‘system supporter’.  Much of the literature concerning Norway as a 
middle power, especially that which is concerned with analysing the country 
during the Cold War era, tends to regard Norway as being ‘selfless’ in its foreign 
policy and as its ignoring the national interest. However, Norway is not simply a 
do-good international citizen, as middle powers often are categorised, or as 
exceptional as the Norwegian self-image largely claims to be.  
With the current chapter as a backdrop, the rest of the thesis will analyse 
Norway’s role as a middle power through its prestige aid programme, OfD, in 
Angola. A critical approach will be favoured in identifying Norway’s self-interest 
in its engagement in Angola. The next chapter will analyse the theoretical 
foundation of the petroleum-related assistance, before an empirical investigation 
is undertaken into Angola in Chapter Four.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORISING THE FOUNDATION OF OIL FOR DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Since colonial independence, millions of aid dollars have been flowing from 
Europe and the USA to the African continent, yet there is still a lack of 
development and Africa continues to remain the poorest continent in the world 
(Abbas and Ndeba, 2009:79). This failure and the social crises of the African 
states are often explained by alluding to the internal weaknesses within the 
states itself and, largely, to the marginalisation of the historical legacy of 
colonialism, global structures and the strong commercial interest of Western 
countries (see Gruffydd Jones, 2008; Obi, 2007).  
This chapter begins with a short introduction to one of the most common 
explanations of why resource-rich countries in the Third World lack 
development, or the so-called ‘resource curse’. Whereas the resource curse 
thesis has mainly concentrated on the domestic challenges that have been 
encountered when explaining the limited development that has taken place in 
resource-rich countries in the Third World, the critique in the current chapter 
focuses on the importance of including global factors and structures. When it 
comes to the political economy of oil, there are several international actors 
whose activities, policies and interests have implications for the development of 
the oil-producing state itself (Obi, 2007:10).  
The first part of the chapter touches upon how the challenge has been 
approached in terms of the granting of petroleum-related assistance to some 
countries that have vast oil and gas resources. Thereafter the Norwegian 
initiative, OfD, is introduced. OfD aims to offer specified assistance to countries 
that are trapped in the so-called ‘resource curse’.  
By acknowledging the power of theory, the current chapter will build on Robert 
Cox’s statement that theory is always intended for someone and for a purpose, 
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and on his favoured method of historical materialism. The chapter will also build 
on Eduard Jordaan’s (2003) argument regarding the importance of asking critical 
questions about the neo-liberal project, and will discuss the terminology that is 
embedded in the project.  Whereas most research into the OfD focuses on the 
resource curse thesis, the chapter will mainly focus on the overarching aim of the 
OfD, namely good governance. It will set out to provide a critical analysis of the 
good governance agenda, which seldom is questioned in relation to petroleum-
related assistance. Important and critical questions will be raised, such as: 
Where does the concept of good governance originate? What is the agenda 
behind it?  Who benefits from the theory and concept? And, not least, is it really 
contributing to the development of the Third World, or is it, to a larger extent, 
benefiting the already developed and the rich?   
3.2 The Resource Curse and Petroleum-related Assistance 
Africa is a continent with large natural resources, which not only represent a 
source of wealth, but also a possible source of power. Still, most resource-rich 
countries in Africa have not been able to use such resources to their own benefit 
and to offer their own population good welfare services. Currently, the World 
Bank and IMF classify twelve of the world’s mineral-rich states, and six of the oil-
rich states, as being highly indebted poor countries (Ayangafac, 2008:44).  
Since large parts of the world are dependent on many of the natural resources 
found in Africa, there has been an increased focus on how resource-rich 
countries in Africa can make their own way out of poverty. However, there 
seems to be a negative correlation between natural resources and economic 
development on the African continent (Collier, 2007). This has generated a 
growing amount of literature on what is called the ‘resource curse’, which is a 
term that has gained increasing currency within academia and policy-making 
circles. The resource curse thesis hold that only a small number of resource-rich 
countries have benefited from their strategic resources, including oil, diamonds 
and minerals, with their possession of such resources having often been linked to 
civil wars (‘resource wars’) and having been a cause of social crises in Africa. 
Indeed, natural resources have been at the centre of debates concerning 
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development since the time of the Malthus and Ricardo studies (Jones, 2008), 
with literature in the field being extensive (see Ross, 2008; Rosser, 2006; Sachs 
and Warner, 2001).  
The literature refers to several versions of the resource curse, with some having 
weaker explanatory power than others. The short, and comparatively simplified, 
version of the thesis holds that there is a natural connection between natural 
resources and how they fuel state corruption, profligacy, social crises and violent 
conflicts in poor countries. The challenges are often seen in the context of the 
power dynamics within a specific country, in terms of which the responsibility 
for the failure of development lies within the government. It is the government, 
together with the civil servants and a small group of elites that amass personal 
wealth, thereby excluding the majority of the population from benefiting from 
the country’s natural resources (Jones, 2008; Obi, 2007).  
In recent years, a consensus has emerged that is related to a stronger version of 
the resource curse thesis, which is centred on institution building.13 There is an 
increasing assumption that one needs to start with the building up of institutions 
and government structures to be able to create conditions in which natural 
resource wealth will support, rather than diminish, growth in developing 
countries (Jones, 2008:12). Recent research is also very clear on the need to 
strengthen those institutions that curb patronage and rent-seeking, particularly 
in order to fight corruption.  
It is important to clarify one of the most common mistakes when talking about 
the resource curse: the possession of oil alone leads neither to violence nor to 
corruption. For oil-rich countries that possess the potential for rapid 
development, the entire situation boils down to them getting their politics right 
(Obi, 2007). There is no natural resource curse, which automatically leads 
resource-rich countries to develop bad democratic states. In many ways, existing 
approaches do not sufficiently take into account the distinctiveness of natural 
                                                        
13 Defining ‘institutions’ is useful, as it is currently linked to governance. The present 
thesis uses the same definition as do Kolstad, Wiig and Williams (2009:956), who define 
governance as “a subset of institutions explicitly referring to political institutions or 
rules of the political game”.  
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resources vis-à-vis other factors that contribute to weak institutional conditions 
(Jones, 2008). Overall, the theory does not fully capture the complex dimensions 
of the politics and the international linkages that underpin violent conflict, 
corruption and bad governance in Africa. Instead, it overemphasises one single 
factor, such as oil.  Obi (2007:14) argues that a “deeper reflection shows that the 
reality is more of an interplay between a set of interrelated factors, rather than 
the inevitable result of a single determinant”.      
The focus on the negative correlation between oil and economic growth in 
countries with weak institutions has called for a wide range of different 
petroleum-related assistance programmes, with, in many oil-rich nations, the aid 
programmes constituting a significant proportion of total aid received (Kolstad 
et al., 2009). Kolstad et al. (2009:954) define petroleum-related aid as “activities 
aiming to improve the development impact of petroleum resources, i.e. oil and 
gas”. Many donors offer petroleum-related aid. However, Norway is the only 
donor that has integrated its different activities into a single programme. The 
Minister of International Development, Erik Solheim, has stated very clearly that 
oil should be a blessing for all countries, and not a curse (Norad, 2007). The rest 
of Chapter Three will explore the theoretical basis of the aid programme and 
how Norway’s programme is aiming to cure the curse.  
3.2.1 A Norwegian Attempt to Cure the Resource Curse 
Oil was found offshore the Norwegian coast on Christmas Eve in 1969, with the 
country, since then, having been transformed into ‘The Norwegian oil fairytale’. 
With the discovery of ‘black gold’, the Norwegian government was able to 
implement three main objectives: (1) to attain full employment; (2) to achieve 
greater equality through the redistribution of wealth; and (3) to expand the 
welfare state. With the significant oil revenues involved, Norway was able to 
increase its spending on social services, pensions and public employment, and to 
grant huge subsidies to agriculture and industry.  
The oil industry grew fast, and Norway soon became a large oil producer, with 
extensive knowledge of deep-water drilling. Probably the most enlightened 
accomplishment of Norway’s ‘oil bonanza’ was the creation of a ‘petroleum fund’, 
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which was set up to store wealth for when the oil reserves would run dry, and to 
avoid overheating of the economy. Today, the fund is called the Norwegian 
Pension Fund, and is the largest pension fund in the world. With a strong and 
active government, Norway was able to escape the resource curse and the ‘Dutch 
disease’, and is often used as an example of how large oil resources can serve as a 
blessing to a country.   
Norway has been providing petroleum-related assistance since the early 1980s, 
and the OfD initiative was established in 2005 in an effort to extend and better to 
coordinate this type of assistance. The programme claims not necessarily to 
export a ‘Norwegian model’ for the governance of oil-rich nations, but rather to 
offer knowledge and assistance in the form of resource management and “to 
manage petroleum resources in a way that generates economic growth, 
promotes welfare of the population in general and which is environmentally 
sustainable” (Norad, 2007:5).  OfD aims to enable petroleum-producing 
countries to utilise their oil and gas revenues to reduce poverty and to create 
prosperity for the majority of the population, and not to allow money to 
disappear into the pockets of only a few (Govender and Skagestad, 2009:13; 
Norad, 2007). The programme is a priority area in Norwegian development 
assistance, with Norway today being one of the largest bilateral donors in 
petroleum-related assistance worldwide.  
The programme is a joint effort of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Petroleum 
and Energy, Finance, and Environment, which, together, create directions and 
guidelines for the project. The regular implementing organisation (the 
secretariat) is located within Norad. All aid allocation decisions are taken in 
extensive consultation with the secretariat, chaired by a representative of the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry, and integrated around three main themes:  
resource management; revenue management; and environmental management. 
‘Good governance’ is the overarching topic, with the overall aim being 
sustainable development (Norad, 2008).  
Considering that the petroleum sector was first included in international 
development cooperation in the 1980s, spending can be seen to have increased 
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most rapidly in recent years.14 From 2007 to 2008 alone, the amount of aid 
increased 44 per cent from USD 31.6m to USD 45.6m.  Table 3.1 below shows the 
allocations of the OfD initiative in 2008 and 2009 in the ten long-term co-
operation countries: Angola; Bolivia; Ghana; Madagascar; Mozambique; Nigeria; 
the Sudan; Timor-Leste; Uganda; and Vietnam.15  
Table 3.1:  Distribution of budget funds by country, in NOK 1 000. 
Country16 2008 2009 
Angola 7 888 13 548 
Bolivia 2 805 5 976 
Ghana 3428 8 308 
Madagascar 12 574 4 303 
Mozambique 18 802 13 861 
Nigeria 4 511 4 559 
Sudan 13 476 10 951 
Timor-Leste 13 553 19 670 
Uganda 8 419 13 808 
Vietnam  1 657 – 
Total  87 113 94 984 
Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate [s.d.]. 
In 2007, the largest recipients of aid in terms of the OfD initiative were East 
Timor and Iraq, while, in 2008, a shift occurred in allocation, in terms of which 
Angola and Mozambique joined East Timor as being the larger recipients.  
The OfD initiative is small in relative budgetary terms, constituting only 1.1 per 
cent of Norway’s bilateral aid in 2007. However, the discrepancy between the 
rhetoric – which stresses the importance of the programme – and its relatively 
small budget can be explained mainly by the fact that the programme is 
relatively new. Further, it is important to bear in mind that the programme itself 
actually does not fund large investments, as other such programmes usually do. 
Rather, OfD is based on the sharing of knowledge and positive experiences.  
                                                        
14 Between 1994 and 2004, approximately NOK 440m was spent on petroleum 
assistance, and an economic overview indicates that there was an 80 per cent increase 
from the 82m NOK spent in 2006, to the NOK 148m spent in 2007 (Norad, 2008).  
15 In 2007, 53 per cent of the expenditure was allocated to African countries. The share 
is expected to increase to 61 per cent in 2008 (Norad, 2008).  
16 Distribution of budget funds by country, in NOK 1 000 (Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate). Data available on: http://www.norad.no/en/Thematic+areas/Energy/ 
Oil+for+Development/Who+we+are. 
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So far, the programme has been rather fragmented, with activities varying to a 
great extent from country to country. OfD is today represented in 25 different 
countries, where it handles capacity-building in such areas as legal framework, 
administration and supervision mechanisms, licensing and tendering processes, 
the organisation of public–private interfaces, local content and industrial 
development, environmental challenges, and revenue management issues, 
including taxation and petroleum funds (Norad, 2008). The aid programme is 
tailored to each country with which it is concerned, as they all face different 
challenges. Some countries produced oil before Norway’s involvement, while, in 
other countries, oil production is a fairly new industry. The OfD evaluation 
report of 2007 concludes that the results are significantly better in countries 
where OfD became involved at an early stage, such as Mozambique and Ghana, of 
which two countries Norway has large expectations. In other countries, such as 
Angola, it seems more difficult to have any impact on the already existing 
structures and systems that are connected to the oil industry (Norad, 2007). 
Although the concessions that are granted to OfD are increasing, the number of 
long-term cooperation countries is restricted to today’s ten core countries, 
whereas there are currently 15 countries that provide limited cooperation. The 
demand for petroleum-related assistance is growing, and criteria have been 
developed for choosing those countries that will be included as OfD core 
countries. Firstly, the programme has a policy that such cooperation must be 
demand-driven, and, secondly, Norwegian expertise must be relevant for the 
country whose needs are addressed by the programme. Other factors that are 
also noted as being of importance are that the host country has to be committed 
to poverty reduction; to improving the welfare of the majority of its population; 
to the sustainable development of resources; and to addressing those 
environmental challenges that are related to petroleum activities. Not least of the 
considerations is the fact that Norway, as the host of the chair of the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), sees as essential that any country 
seeking assistance through the OfD programme is committed to the EITI 
programme regarding the improvement of transparency. 
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Theoretically, it is interesting to contrast literature related to the resource curse 
thesis to OfD’s specific policies. OfD’s stake in the resource curse emphasises 
institution-building, and focuses on the capacity-building of national institutions. 
However, it is important that the activities reflect the policy implications of 
recent research, and that the programme aims to build or to strengthen the right 
kind of institutions. Kolstad et al. (2009:963) argue that the OfD programme 
does not “really reflect the policy prescriptions of the scientific literature on the 
resource curse, which makes it unlikely that they will produce the institutional 
changes required to lift the curse”.  In many resource-rich countries, it is often 
the most powerful group that benefits from dysfunctional institutions, with it 
being unlikely that corrupt government officials will support any reforms 
reducing personal profit. In short, the thesis builds on the contention of Kolstad 
et al. (2009:957) that “institutions are long-lived and hard to change due to 
(colonial) history, social cohesion or political and economic vested interests”. 
The researchers continue to explore the resource curse literature, finding that 
OfD, to a small extent, touches upon this matter, and concludes that the 
programme will be unlikely to make a difference if it does not analyse such 
constraints (Kolstad et al., 2009:957).  
Another constraint with the OfD programme and how it seeks to help countries 
that are trapped within the resource curse is that the programme is based on the 
assumption that the reasons for the problem are to be found within the resource-
rich country itself. As was mentioned earlier, most literature that relates to the 
resource curse focuses on the national level, in a rather static manner, with the 
historical context and global structures receiving little attention. In a globalised 
world, the central agencies of the state must be seen as being interlinked with 
international institutions and multinational corporations, as increasingly more 
decisions are taken outside each individual state. As a consequence, the decisions 
that are made in the central banks, the Prime Minister’s office, or within the 
bureaucracy cannot only be regarded as domestic issues (Cox, 1987). To reach a 
comprehensive analysis of the dynamics of international relations, it is desirable 
to include different geographical levels of analyses (Levy, 2001:3). An analysis 
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that considers the global, national and sub-national levels separately – and that 
avoids taking an historical approach – is far too simplistic.  
Another finding of Kolstad et al. (2009:963) is that petroleum-related assistance 
is usually offered by those donors and actors who have a commercial and 
political interest in the oil sector.  They conclude that “(t)he existing focus on 
revenue, resource, and environmental management prevalent in petroleum-
related aid is too narrow and sector-specific to address overarching problems of 
accountability and unfavourable incentives that are at the core of the resource 
curse. Nor does capacity building and technical assistance per se induce positive 
institutional change” (Kolstad et al., 2009:963). 
Despite OfD’s approach depending on national context, some elements are 
recurrent. The cross-cutting dimensions of good governance are the overarching 
focus of attention of OfD, with such considerations being omnipresent 
throughout the programme. Employing Cox’s critical methodology, the next 
section of the thesis will take a more historical approach in addressing the 
reason for the lack of development in today’s underdeveloped countries, 
including resource-rich countries. The aim of the section is to illustrate from 
where the good governance agenda emerges and what the related discourse 
involves.  
3.3 The Good Governance Agenda  
3.3.1 Origins of Good Governance 
The argument made by critical political economists is that, in order to 
understand the lack of development and the crisis of the African states, what 
must be taken into account is how each of the countries is integrated into the 
global order; the political economy and the international division of labour; and 
how the forces and structures affect domestic development (Cox, 1987; Gruffydd 
Jones, 2008). Scholars arguing from within the field argue that it is impossible to 
understand economic development without recognising the importance of the 
rise of capitalism in Western Europe between the 15th and 19th centuries 
(Reinert, 2004).  
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John Saul (2006:1) explains:  
Europe chose to accelerate a process of world conquest that had begun 
with the exploits of Spain and Portugal in the very earliest day of 
mercantile capitalism’s dawn and that continued unabated as stronger, 
more fully realized capitalist economies emerged in Holland, Germany, 
France and England to complement, even displace, the centrality of earlier 
Spanish and Portuguese global assertions. To make a long story short, the 
rest of the world was subordinated to the economic requirements of 
expanding European economic and military might. As a result, by the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries most of the global South had been 
battered and pillaged, and then, ultimately, tied to Western economic 
centres by lead-strings of economic and political (including formally 
colonial) provenance. A global hierarchy was thus formed, in 
geographical, class and racial terms that would have a profound, even 
crippling, effect on the economic and social prospects of the cast majority 
of the world’s population. 
The colonial era perpetuated the above-mentioned historical structure, in terms 
of which African countries were exploited and robbed by the European powers, 
resulting in the development of, and profits maximising in, the North, resulting in 
minimising the development of the South (Abbas and Ndeda, 2009:77). The 
international division of labour force depended on the supply of an unskilled, 
cheap labour force in Africa that was used to extract resources, while the labour 
force in Europe developed and advanced technology to create growth. Such 
prioritising resulted in what Walter Rodney (1972) calls underdevelopment of 
the African continent, which he comprehensively explains in his book How 
Europe underdeveloped Africa. Rodney considered the underdevelopment 
process as being the greatest injustice to have been perpetrated under colonial 
rule.  
At the All-African People’s Conference in Cairo in 1961, the term ‘neo-
colonialism’ emerged to symbolise that the end of colonial rule did not necessary 
mean that the African continent was independent (Mazrui, 1967:74). While most 
African countries were decolonised in the 1960s and 1970s, it did not lead to a 
total abolishment of the phenomenon. “Classic colonialism is a relic but its 
absence does not mean that there are no ‘colonial’ interests to safeguard” 
(Omari, 2001, quoted in Taylor, 2003:47). Europe left the colonised countries 
dependent on European trade and maintained its influence through neo-
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colonialism, which Nkrumah (1965) describes as an advanced stage of 
imperialism.   
Nkrumah (1965) argues that the African countries emerging out of colonial rule 
inherited a colonial economic system that, for centuries, had produced raw 
materials for the countries in the North, and that such structures were not likely 
to change after decolonisation. The result of neo-colonialism is that foreign 
capital is used to continue exploitation, rather than for the development of the 
less developed part of the world. These forms of investment would only tend to 
increase the gap between the rich and the poor countries. African countries are, 
in theory, independent “and have all the outward trappings of international 
sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is 
directed from outside” (Nkrumah, 1965:x). The process of colonialism and 
slavery created political subjugation, social devastation and economic regression 
(Abbas and Ndeda, 2009:77). According to Rodney,  
[t]he factor of dependency made its impact felt in every aspect of the life of 
the colonies, and it can be regarded as the crowning vice among the negative 
social, political, and economic consequences of colonialism in Africa, being 
primarily responsible for the perpetuation of the colonial relationship into 
the epoch that is called neo-colonialism. 
     (Rodney, 1972:236) 
Nkrumah17 refers to the post-independence of African countries, and to their 
lack of development, as ‘neo-colonialism’, while other scholars have other names 
for the same phenomenon. Rodney makes use of the term ‘underdevelopment’, 
as does Andre Günder Frank, who studied the effects of the colonial powers in 
Latin America. Lenin called the same concept ‘semi-colonialism’ when writing in 
1916. However, all such terms refer to the creation of a state of dependency, in 
which the South has been subordinated to the needs and demands of the North, 
throughout the period of colonialism and until today. Saul (2006:9) points to the 
fact that the countries’ location in the global hierarchy of nations created in the 
colonial structures/system seems to be a good predictor of a state’s economic 
prospects. He illustrates how the hierarchal ranking has remained remarkably 
stable from the 1930s until today.  
                                                        
17 This also includes Franz Fanon, whose theory will be elaborated on in Chapter 
Four.   
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The main argument within the approach is that underdeveloped countries are 
not just ‘behind’ the further developed countries in the global political economy. 
Rather, the developing countries remain subordinated to the developed 
countries by various mechanisms that must be dealt with, and taken into, the 
analytical framework when aiming at creating development (Saul, 2006:10). Saul 
continues his argument to underpin that “ d ependency is a real feature of 
contemporary international relations” (Saul, 2006:10).18 
Robert Cox (1987) writes that, in the early decades of the 19th century, one saw 
a new period of production emerging: the liberal era. The new period became the 
basis for a new hegemonic era, during which the USA was raised as the new 
world hegemon, being referred to by Cox as the Pax Americana (Cox, 1987:394). 
The USA aimed to put in place a new world order, in which many of the Western 
states transformed their state structure and rebuilt themselves after the Second 
World War with the Marshall Plan contributions, which committed them to a US- 
led world order. The term ‘superpower’ entered the political vocabulary to 
distinguish the USA and the Soviet Union from the other states in the power 
hierarchy (Cox, 1987:211). An institutional framework was created to support 
the structures in the bipolar world order, with the UN, the World Bank and the 
IMF being created to support the US creation of the neo-liberal forms of state and 
world order.  
Colonial ties obviously had an effect on the formation of African states. However, 
the new actors would play a large role in redefining the relationship between the 
state and the market in meeting social needs after many of the African countries 
gained independence (Wilson, Kanji and Braathen, 2001:2). The Bretton Wood 
institutions, especially the IMF, were able to use both incentives and sanctions to 
ensure that weaker countries with more reluctant governments and weak 
economies submitted to the new world order.19  
  
                                                        
18 Aid is a new form of colonialism/imperialism.  
19 Cox (1987:395) argues that the “structures” are not “givens” (data), but are “mades” 
(facts) – made by collective human action and transformable by collective human 
action.”  
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Abbas and Ndeba (2009:79) explain:  
With the advent of the Washington Consensus and its Bretton Woods 
institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, political conditionality and aid dependence have marred Africa’s 
independent development and economic self‐determination. Imposed 
economic and political programmes and structures that serve the 
economic interests of Europe and the United States, coupled with a 
staggering aid dependence for most African countries, continue to 
retrench Africa systematically in the vicious cycle of political and 
economic regression and dependence.  
Pressure was exerted on the state to tackle poverty, with structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) being imposed by the Bretton Wood institutions. African 
countries were introduced to the global political economy.  The framework, with 
its ‘legal’ international institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, made it 
possible to perpetuate the structures created during colonialism, which 
generated underdevelopment. Such institutions are now controlled by the most 
powerful nations in the world, with the G8 group controlling almost half of the 
votes in the IMF20, leading to a situation in which the interests of the wealthy 
countries are met at the expense of those in the poor (Murithi, 2009).  
Rita Abrahamsen (2001:10–11) explains how the SAPs affected all segments of 
the population. The state was affected by the debt crisis; unemployment 
increased, which made the poor even poorer; the purchasing power of the 
middle class decreased; and the elite were affected in their patronage 
relationship by global financial difficulties. Through the policies of the IMF and 
the World Bank, external actors had become more deeply involved in domestic 
affairs and in domestic politics.    
The late 1980s saw a retreat of Keynesianism to neo-liberalism, which, in many 
ways, can be described as having an even more explicitly undemocratic character 
(Abrahamsen, 2001:29). Since state-led development had failed, the Bretton 
Wood institutions were brought into line with the neo-liberal project, in terms of 
which the state was not only supposed simultaneously to become both better 
and smaller than it had previously been.  The 1989 report from the World Bank, 
                                                        
20 The G7 states account for 40 per cent of the voting power in the World Bank, 
compared with just over 4 per cent for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa (Abrahamsen, 
2001:12). 
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Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, placed good governance at 
the heart of the donor agenda.  
Without critical analysis of the good governance discourse and other concepts 
that are used in development programmes, the power relations and the 
underlying self-interest remain hidden. Robert Cox (1987) claims that theory is 
always for someone and for some purpose, while Rita Abrahamsen (2001) 
unveils how knowledge is used as a technology of power in development 
relations (Lavelle, 2005).  In terms of such thinking, it becomes important to ask 
“Whom does this discourse serve?”21 
3.3.2 ‘Good Governance’ – A Solution for Whom? 
The lack of development in Africa during the Cold War was blamed on the lack of 
attention to governmental issues. Due to a changing balance of power, the 
development discourse changed. ‘Governance’ was introduced as a substitute for 
‘power’, representing a framework originating in the USA that was able to create 
an illusion that one depended on good governance to create development (Amin, 
2010:64). ‘Good governance’ became a buzzword that was synonymous with 
development for the next few decades. The SAPs from the 1960s and 1970s had 
not shown the desired results. In contrast, the neo-liberal project could not as 
easily be abandoned, and the good governance approach would continue the 
same neo-liberal project, but simply implement it in another way, with more 
focus on democracy and governance (Abrahamsen, 2001:43).  
The US establishment has favoured the discourse related to the term, though it 
has never been defined and Europeans and institutions of the global system 
(such as the UN and the World Bank) have uncritically adopted the term (Amin, 
2010). ‘Good governance’ is largely seen as a term within development aid, used 
as a goal or as a condition for aid, which contains a set of values, political and 
administrative elements that should be linked to the development project. 
During the Cold War, Africa had become the playground for proxy wars where 
the emerging superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union, fought for global 
                                                        
21 Foucault (1980) discusses this in the relationship between power and knowledge. 
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influence.22 With the decline of the superpower rivalry, the African continent 
became less strategically interesting for the major powers in the West. 
Simultaneously with the end of the Cold War, the good governance agenda 
emerged to signal the arrival of the West as the hegemon in the Third World, 
which now represented the only alternative for the countries as loan donors 
(Amin, 2010).  
Gruffydd Jones (2008) illustrates in her in-depth analysis of the ‘failed states’ 
concept the power of adopting a terminology into the Western vocabulary 
without asking critical questions and without putting it into an historical context. 
Since the US Minister of Foreign Affairs, Madeline Albright, introduced the word 
‘failed states’ during the 1990s, it has been adopted uncritically by journalists, 
politicians, and even academics, and the Western powers have used the term to 
legitimise interventions in the underdeveloped world (Gruffydd Jones, 2008). 
There seems to be a trend, in terms of which the neo-liberal hegemony has 
created a discourse, in which the present is treated as if it has no history, and in 
terms of which the developed world has no responsibility for the ‘bad 
governance’ that has been taking place in Africa since Europeans first started to 
exploit the continent.23  
In Abrahamsen’s (2001) deep historical analysis of good governance, she places 
the discourse in a wider context of a changing global power balance, seeing how 
the concept is developed to sustain and reproduce the specific forms of power 
and politics that the USA produced in the Pax Americana. Abrahamsen (2001:45) 
explains that one cannot see the good governance agenda simply as a 
humanitarian effort that is concerned with promoting development, growth and 
democracy. Instead, one needs to see the agenda as a development discourse that 
is intrinsically linked to a larger discursive practice, in which global power and 
domination are exercised. Abrahamsen (2001:64) highlights the power of 
                                                        
22 Presenting African countries merely as victims of the Cold War is too simplistic. It also 
gave African leaders the opportunity to set the superpowers up against each other, to 
attract foreign aid, and to increase the perceiver international importance of their own 
countries.  
23 Not to forget all the Western multinational companies that have made money out of 
conflict on the continent, and some that have even aided such conflict (see, for e.g., Reno, 
2000).  
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development to ‘seduce’, showing how this is evident in good governance 
discourse. Language is forceful when it claims to ‘empower’, ‘democratise’ and 
‘liberate’ civil society, all of which terms can be seen as abstract words, in terms 
of which the concept of good governance always leads back to one factor: 
economic liberation (Abrahamsen, 2001:64; Amin, 2010).  
The discourse around good governance is often equated with democracy, and it is 
made clear that democracy would not be possible without the existence of liberal 
economic policies. In this way, one can argue that the use of such terms is only an 
attempt to give the discourse a democratic face, and to legitimise a continuation 
of the structural adjustment programmes, while simultaneously delegitimising a 
more interventionist and socialist strategy, which, by implication, becomes an 
example of ‘poor governance’ (Easterly, 2006). 
‘Good governance’ is obviously a heavily value-laden concept, which, for most 
Africans, is associated with meaning a free market economy, which, in the end, 
can be agreed on as defending Western interests. The term is defined by the 
developed, industrialised market economy countries in the richer North, and by 
multiparty systems, as an economy that is based on private ownership and free 
trade. In the same vein, the countries that undermine these interests are often 
defined as being undemocratic.24 In many ways, political conditionality has been 
reconfigured in the terminology as good governance, which has become a 
prevailing dominant discourse within development in terms of which Western 
interests are well protected and the fundamental tenets of the Washington 
Consensus are reflected (Biney, 2009; Nyerere, 2009). According to these terms, 
one can argue that aid largely is given to those countries that accept the neo-
hegemonic world order and that do not intend to challenge the status quo. 
3.3.3 Norway, OfD and the Good Governance Concept 
The Norwegian development assistance has been strongly influenced by the 
intense discussion between neo-liberal economics and dependency theories 
during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The development aid policies and the 
economic and political relations between the developed and underdeveloped 
                                                        
24 There are exceptions, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where the USA has other interests 
to maintain.  
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countries were under intense discussion during this period, at both a theoretical 
and a political level. White papers and political debates were influenced by both 
the demands of a NIEO among the developing nations within the UN and by the 
World Bank’s SAPs.  
The above resulted in many dilemmas and contradictions between theory and 
reality within development in the latter decades of the 20th century (Fält, 
2009:84).  The theoretical platform originating from the dependency field 
managed to distance itself from only focusing on domestic challenges within the 
developing states, and rather centred attention on global structures. The school 
of thought identified global economic and political inequality between the rich 
and poor parts of the world. It highlighted the need to give the developing 
countries sufficient space to develop their own independent development 
policies and development strategy, avoiding too much influence from the 
Western world and what is referred to as neo-colonialism, but also assuring that 
fundamental democracy principles were followed.  
In contrast, with the above strategy there was a concern regarding the challenges 
within many of the Third World countries that had weak governments, where 
human rights and democratic principles were fragile. From this concern, the 
demand of good governance emerged, and Norway started to place conditions 
related to good governance upon the recipient countries. It is within such a 
context that the good governance concept was adopted into the Norwegian 
development aid rhetoric, which was strongly influenced by the neo-liberal 
school.  
Norway had offered the assistance of experts along with their aid to the receiving 
countries during the 1970 and 1980s. The approach changed in the 1990s, with 
the revised focus being placed on the creation of a more local ownership to the 
development and aid programmes. The responsibility of creating development 
was placed on the receiving government. Capacity-building, the development of 
institutions, and research were key elements in developing good governance in 
recipient countries. Unfortunately, more than a decade later, with millions of aid 
dollars having been invested in capacity and institution-building, the results of 
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creating good governance have been much less than had been hoped for 
(Hansen, 2004).  
In research undertaken for the current thesis, no sources were found where 
Norad questioned where the good governance25 concept originated. The concept 
seems to be unquestioned in terms of Norwegian development assistance, and 
has largely been uncritically adopted into the development terminology. 
However, OfD has developed a checklist for assessing the state of petroleum-
related governance in a given country, which draws heavily on principles and 
indicators developed by Chatham House.26 Key characteristics in the Chatham 
Charter include the clear division of roles, long-term perspectives, transparent 
policies and processes, authorities with sufficient expertise to monitor and to 
report on oil companies, and a civil society that can hold their government 
accountable for its actions.  
The natural question of the thesis is to ask whether the approach is creating a 
fundamental change, and whether it challenges the underlying structures that 
stagger development. The aim for Chatham House (in cooperation with The 
Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law Policy at the University of 
Dundee) was better to enable national decision-makers to govern their 
petroleum resources in a way that would have major socio-economic benefits for 
the majority of the population (Myers and Lahn, 2006).  To be able to do this, 
they created a forum for national oil companies and the Ministries of Energy and 
Petroleum to meet their counter partners to exchange views related to 
governance.  
These principles were developed, and aimed at establishing a common 
understanding of good governance between representatives from 16 different 
oil-producing countries, together with international oil companies (Myers and 
                                                        
25 Oil for Development originally had three cross-cutting components: good governance, 
transparency, and accountability. It was later argued that all three components intended 
the same thing and could be merged under the good governance component, which is 
supposed to be reflected in all three fields where OfD works.  
26 For more information on the topic, see: 
http://www.norad.no/en/Thematic+areas/Energy/Oil+for+Development/OfD+Informa
tion+Package/Good+Governance.  
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Lahn, 2006).   The result, after joint workshops, case studies and in-depth 
research, was five universal principles of good governance: (1) clarity of goals, 
roles and responsibilities; (2) enablement to carry out the role assigned; (3) 
accountability of decision-making and performance; (4) transparency of 
information; and (5) sustainable development for future generations.  
Chatham House has received recognition from several institutions for its work, 
including for that which has been undertaken into the Norwegian petroleum-
related assistance programme. However, what is worth noting in this case is that, 
even though civil society is mentioned together with external actors, what 
amounts to good governance is defined in London by stakeholders who have a 
major interest in oil. NGOs and civil society have also been invited to some of the 
workshops. However, the main objective of the project has been “to bring 
together oil  producers in constructive dialogue about the governance of their 
national petroleum sector” (Myers and Lahn, 2006:4). 
In Norad’s Strategy Paper towards 2005 (Norad, 1998:131), the agency 
recognises that an improvement in governance demands political will from the 
government, and requires a change in the power structures.  The Norad paper 
continues with explaining that those processes that aim to change power 
structures are highly sensitive and complex, entailing change within the elite. 
What the paper does not mention is that such change also includes the elite in 
the North. One cannot limit the process to only include ‘politically sensitive 
changes’ in the South. The discussion loses its credibility if it only includes a 
change in the power relations on a national level in the South, but does not 
include redistribution on a global level.  
3.4 Summary 
Africa is currently the biggest receiver of aid, but still the terms, conditions and 
principles upon which the aid is delivered are not defined by the receiver, but by 
the donor (Abbas and Ndeba, 2009:vii). The discourse around ‘good governance’ 
has developed with the requirement that the obstacles to development lie within 
each state, which excludes the global structural level of analyses, and can be seen 
as a way of deflecting attention from the structure and constraints imposed by 
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the world economy (Schulz, 2001:106). Regarding good governance as an 
exclusively positive concept, this chapter has demonstrated that the good 
governance discourse and its mainstream perception serve to legitimise a 
particular form of liberal democracy and neo-liberal economic framework. Not 
least, it falls short of being a tool that is able to explore what specifically needs to 
be done in a real-world context (Gridle, 2007).  According to Jones (2008), the 
resource curse thesis should be seen as being symptomatic of the current good 
governance agenda, and it is obvious that the literature behind both the resource 
curse thesis and the good governance agenda originates from Western scholars, 
reflecting Western views and serving Western interests.  
Norway and the OfD programme have adopted such discourse without any 
hesitation, with the aim of saving countries from the so-called resource curse. As 
this chapter has shown, the literature and terminology of OfD can indicate that 
Norway, as a traditional middle power, is not attempting to shake any global 
structures, but rather to mask their approach on a domestic level with strategic 
goals that have been set with the Third World in mind. With good intentions, and 
hopefully contributing their petroleum expertise along the way, Norway is 
supporting Jordaan’s middle power theory, while simultaneously illustrating 
contradictions in Norway’s self-image as a do-good nation. By putting the good 
governance concept into historical context and by subjecting it to critical 
analysis, one can detect the self-interest of the Norwegian government on a 
deeper level than might otherwise be possible.    
In short, one could say that the theoretical foundation of OfD is based on a 
problem-solving approach, in terms of which global structures are largely 
excluded, and the focus is on domestic challenges.  The literature indicates that 
such an approach does not lead to fundamental change that can benefit poor 
people or underdeveloped countries, which is key to critical political economy. 
The discussion regarding lack of development should, to a much greater extent 
than it currently does, merge internal and external factors with a historical 
approach to better identify what the real challenge behind the lack of 
development really is and how best to approach it. As noted by Kolstad et al. 
(2009) regarding OfD, a deeper understanding of the recipient country’s political 
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economy is needed to contribute to positive and sustainable development, and 
not least by means of addressing corruption. 
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CHAPTER 4 
OILING DEVELOPMENT IN ANGOLA? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Consideration must be given to why Angola, as one of the largest oil producers in 
Africa, ranks as one of the least developed countries on the continent and in the 
world.27 It is debatable whether Norway’s contribution through OfD is helping to 
improve Angola’s striving towards sustainable development, or whether 
Norwegian aid is, in fact, supporting institutions that inhibit progressive change. 
These are two of the issues that are addressed in this chapter. 
The two previous chapters stressed the importance of analysing aid programmes 
within the framework of the historical political economy. The current chapter 
aims to illustrate this point in an empirical context. The objective of the chapter 
is to explore the Angolan political economy and to question whether Norway – 
through OfD – is contributing to fundamental change in Angola. To be able to do 
conduct the exploration, it is important to explore different entry points for 
change, on a global, state and substate level. The chapter locates the Angolan 
state within the structural and historical framework of neocolonial capitalism 
and seeks to answer the main question of the thesis, namely who Norway is 
aiding in Angola.   
The first part of the current chapter analyses the political economy of Angola, 
aiming to go beyond the superficial definition of a so-called democratic 
transition in academia that often equates ‘democracy’ with economic and 
political liberalisation, as was discussed in Chapter Three. The analysis will be 
followed by a short historical overview of Norway’s engagement in Angola from 
the time of the liberation struggle to that of the modern-day petroleum-related 
assistance. The last part of the chapter will point out contradictions in the 
                                                        
27 See UNDP’s Human Development Index table.  
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relationship between Norway’s development policy and Angola as the biggest 
recipient of aid through OfD.  
The chapter illustrates that Norway is not challenging the underlying issues and 
root causes that prevent the majority of Angolans from benefiting from national 
oil revenues. In this respect, OfD is not supporting the most efficient entry point 
for change, but instead favouring state–state support to Angola. The political 
economy structures are deep and complex, and Norway, as a middle power, 
cannot challenge the existing structures and the status quo without jeopardising 
its national interests in the resource-rich country.   
4.2 Angola – The Paradox of Plenty 
Angola is a resource-rich country on the Atlantic coastline of south-western 
Africa. With a population of 12.8 million, Angola was ranked number 148 out of 
170 countries on the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) yearly 
human development index in 2008. The country’s life expectancy rate is as low 
as 38 years, with every fourth child dying under the age of five. The literacy rate 
is as high as 67 per cent, with a large gender gap. Only 54 per cent of the women 
can read, whereas 82 per cent of the men are literate (CIA Factbook, [s.d.]).28 
Simultaneously, Angola has emerged as one of the world’s fastest growing 
economies, thanks to soaring oil prices and major international investments. Its 
capital, Luanda, is located on the country’s 1 600-km-long coastline and 
represents a growing centre for both international oil companies and aid 
organisations. Luanda is not representative of the country’s demography and 
growth, but rather the opposite. The rural areas are still strongly affected by the 
27-year-long civil war that ended in 2002, and the large number of landmines 
that can still be found throughout the country have largely not allowed people to 
rebuild and prosper in the affected areas. 
After a downturn in the oil production in Nigeria, Angola has today become 
Africa’s largest producer of oil, contributing over 50 per cent of the nation’s GDP 
                                                        
28 Much of the data from Angola are old and out of date. The last Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey carried out in Angola took place in 2000/01 (Shaxson, Neves and 
Pacheco, 2008:38).  
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(Hodges, 2007:176). With its substantial economic growth, the country is 
increasing its influence in the region. Angola is obviously a country in which 
Western countries have much strategic interest. With the world’s growing 
demand for oil, stability in the oil-rich region has become of national interest for 
all the greater powers in the world, including China and the USA.29  
Malyn Newitt (2007:19) argues that “ m odern Angola is a child of its own 
history”, as the “political transition of its leaders, their relation to the population 
and their attitude to wealth accumulation are all rooted in four hundred years of 
historical development”.  Some knowledge of the country’s history is important 
for an understanding of Angola’s tortuous transition to independence in 1975, 
and its current-day situation. Angolan history has been recaptured and analysed 
at great length by several scholars (see Chabal and Vidal, 2007; Guimaraes, 2001; 
Messiant, 2001, 2007; Power, 2001; Reno, 2000), of whose work only a short 
overview will be provided in the present chapter. The main aim of the section is 
to illustrate that the political economy of Angola was formed by the structures 
that the Portuguese regime imposed on the country when they arrived over 500 
years ago. The export-oriented economy that exploited the natural resources has 
only benefited a selective few. International relations and the nature of the civil 
war are key factors that are important to understand in order to grasp Angola’s 
situation today and how one can identify an entry point of change to create a 
better future.  
4.2.1 From Colonialism to a Multiparty System without Democracy 
The Portuguese first entered Angola as early as 1483, when explorers, who were 
in search of a maritime route to Asia, ventured up the Congo River. The explorers 
came across a region that was inhabited by several large ethnic communities, 
and where ethnic diversity dominated the local politics and society. Such 
diversity has consistently been a source of weakness for the country (Malaquias, 
2007:23–25). After that, many Portuguese settled in Angola, hoping that it would 
be a place of vast natural resources. When they did not find the silver for which 
                                                        
29 Together, China and the USA share 75 per cent of Angolan oil exports, 35 per cent and 
40 per cent respectively (Ng and La Billion, 2007:38). 
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they were hoping, they quickly turned to the slave trade, especially to the biggest 
Portuguese colony at the time, Brazil.30  
Brazil gained independence from Portugal in 1822, which resulted in Portugal 
once more directing its focus towards Angola. In terms of its economy, colonial 
Angola functioned mainly as an exporter of natural raw materials and 
agricultural commodities to Europe. Simultaneously, Angola became an 
important market for Portuguese products, with the raw materials being 
processed in Portugal before being exported back to Angola (Guimaraes, 
2001:16).  
After the Second World War, Portugal experienced an expanded colonial trade 
and faster industrial development, mostly due to the significant role that Angola 
played in such development. The coffee-led boom in Angola, during which 
foreign capital made its way to the colony, largely influenced this period. During 
the period of late colonialism, the trade with Europe increased and Angola 
became increasingly more industrialised. The Angolan economy was no longer 
determined primarily by Portuguese influence, but seemed to follow its own 
path of development (Guimaraes, 2001:22). Whereas the other Portuguese 
colonies in Africa, such as Mozambique and Guinea, were relatively poor and 
underdeveloped, Angola offered the prospect of vast natural resources. Western 
interest in oil and diamonds was high, and the opportunity for many privileged 
sectors of society to enrich themselves was good, whereas the wealth of 
Mozambique and Guinea would have to be developed and earned (Newitt, 
2007:76).   
The Portuguese colonial regime did not collapse like the Belgian regime did in 
neighbouring Congo. Rather, the Portuguese aimed to end the armed liberation 
struggle that started in 1961, not only by force, but also by continuing to 
transform Angola into a modern industrial society (Newitt, 2007:78). The 
Portuguese refused to follow the example of other colonial powers in Africa, with 
Ghana having already gained independence in 1957. Portugal began investing 
                                                        
30 The Portuguese marginalised the indigenous people from the time of their arrival in 
the area. Scholars like Chabal (1982) have called such marginalisation ‘Portuguese 
apartheid’ – see also Malaquias (2007:29). 
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more in Angola than it had done in the past, and continued to integrate it into the 
colonialists’ economy. Contrary to the rest of Africa, for Angola the period 
between 1961 and independence in 1975 represented an economic boom period 
in the colonial economy. With the discovery of oil in 1955, the increased demand 
(and prices) on the world market for the commodity also had spillover effects on 
investments in other sectors in the country. The industry and transport system 
developed rapidly, and, by the time of independence, Angola appeared to have a 
strong economic base (Malaquias, 2007).  However, the Angolan people were 
remained marginalised. During the time of the economic boom, the amount of 
colonial migration to Angola had been significant. However, over half of the  
325 000 new white settlers were neither well educated nor trained in any 
profession, which resulted in a situation in which the Portuguese developed 
Angola into a modern economy, but almost every position in the business sector 
was occupied by the Portuguese, who formed the majority of the commercial 
farmers, senior and mid-level civil servants, engineers, doctors and teachers as 
well, despite them being no better qualified than were the indigenous people 
(Malaquias, 2007:37).  The nature of Portugal’s presence in Angola left behind a 
legacy, which had important implications for Angola’s post-independence 
development.31 
Portugal was the first European colonial power to occupy territory in Africa, and 
one of the last to withdraw from the continent. The Angolan armed resistance to 
Portuguese colonial rule was rather limited, and the Angolan fight for 
independence was not as cohesive as were the resistance movements in the 
other Portuguese-run colonies of Mozambique and Guinea. Angolan 
independence came rather as a result of the popular overthrow of the Salazar 
dictatorship in Portugal, in April 1974, which was led by armed officers who 
opposed colonial rule. The nature of the Angolan resistance was manifested 
through three different nationalist movements that were willing to fight to 
acquire power in Angola, with all three groups receiving some form of support 
from external patrons. The left-wing fraction, called Movimento Popular de 
Libertação de Angola (MPLA), represented a Marxist ideology and received 
                                                        
31 Already in early 1976, 300 000 of the Portuguese settlers had left. 
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substantial support from Cuba and the Soviet Union.32 União Nacional para a 
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), on the other hand, was not founded 
upon any special ideology. Rather, it received its support from the USA and 
apartheid South Africa as an ally against communism. The former power was 
mainly intent on fighting the war against communism, whereas the latter power 
had a more complex interest in the Angolan conflict. South Africa was trying to 
establish itself as a regional hegemon, with the destabilisation of the region being 
part of its strategy, starting primarily with Angola (Nel et al., 2001). Parallel with 
its military support of UNITA, South Africa was fighting a long border war with 
rebel forces in South West Africa, who were intent of fighting for the 
independence of Africa’s soon to be youngest state, Namibia. The third national 
movement, Frente Nacional par a de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) received its 
first support from the USA and South Africa, but later depended on the military 
support that it obtained from Mobutu’s Zaïre.  
It was unclear who would take over power in Angola when the Portuguese 
withdrew from the country in 1975. The Portuguese left so speedily that the 
transfer of power was unsystematic, with them failing to settling any of the 
pending issues concerning Angola’s future. Worse still was the fact that none of 
the liberation movements that were fighting for power had developed a holistic 
strategy for how they would unite and rule the new independent state and lead 
the modern economy. This led to a situation where the guerrilla movements 
adopted the fragile system that the colonial masters had left behind, which was 
based on the occupation of land and the exploitation of resources. There was 
much disagreement concerning the transition government that would pave the 
way for democratic elections, which was seen as the first move that had to be 
toward attaining democratic peace (Malaquias, 2007:34). The MPLA became the 
victorious national movement, when it gained military control of Luanda on 11 
November 1975. However, with UNITA not accepting the new party that had 
come into power, none of the parties involved accepted a power-sharing 
                                                        
32 Tanzania and Congo-Brazzaville supported the MPLA, and also smaller donations 
were done from the Scandinavian countries to support the struggle against colonialism 
(Eriksen, 2000). Norway’s support of Angola and the MPLA will be discussed later on in 
the chapter.  
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agreement, so that the stage was set for the outbreak of one of Africa’s longest 
civil wars so far.  
Agostinho Neto served as the leader of MPLA during the liberation struggle and 
as the first president after independence. His administration (1975–1979) 
inherited its fundamental political structure from the colonial period. The 
administration, with clear characteristics of modern patrimonialism and 
clientism, was maintained and further developed by Eduardo dos Santos from 
1979 until the time of the writing of the current thesis (Newitt, 2007). The 
individuals who occupied the top positions in the party were given access to 
public goods, which they turned into personal profit by participating in the 
informal and illegal economy (trading in USD). The socialist, one-party state 
delegated political responsibility to those who were committed to the ruling 
MPLA party, with the organs of justice and repression following party orders, 
which resulted in the infliction of widespread injustice and discrimination (Vidal, 
2007a).   
Due to Joseph Savimbi’s and UNITA’s unwillingness to accept the MPLA as the 
leading party, the party had to concentrate most of its resources on fighting the 
internal enemy.  UNITA was founded upon no distinct ideology of its own, but 
was motivated by the access that was given to the country’s natural resources by 
the party in power. Such motivation did not stop the USA and South Africa from 
supporting Savimbi, as long as he did not represent a socialist movement. It was 
important for the two countries, USA and South Africa, that the socialist MPLA 
government was blamed for the challenges which were experienced with the 
Angolan economy, which was highly corrupt and neo-patrimonial. The system 
that had mainly been constructed by the previous exploiters received minimal 
consideration, and the MPLA was blamed for the 500 year old system.  
The civil war continued until negotiations were finally successful in 1990. An 
external troika, represented by the USSR, the USA and Portugal, with all three 
countries having a key interest in Angola, directed the negotiations. The MPLA 
was urged to reform into a multiparty system and to reach accommodation with 
UNITA (Vines, Shaxson, Rinli and Heymans, 2005:34). However, the final 
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withdrawal of South African military troops from Angola was only later assured 
when the USA, Angola, South Africa and Cuba33 met in the USA to negotiate the 
so-called New York Quadripartite agreement. The implementation of the 
agreement resulted in South Africa finally withdrawing its troops from southern 
Angola and northern Namibia, leading to the independence of Namibia in 1990.  
The first Angolan election was scheduled for 1992, with it being designed as a 
‘winner-takes-all’ solution, as would have occurred with a military victory. In 
preparing for the election, the MPLA continued to reorganise the state to ensure 
that it gained even more control over the institutions and natural resources than 
it would otherwise have had (Messiant, 2001). With the access to resources and 
control over the press, the MPLA focused on rebuilding their social basis on the 
ground, resulting in their victory in the 1992 election. Savimbi and UNITA could 
not accept the election results, and the MPLA refused to share power. 
Consequently, the MPLA chose to overlook international pressure to 
accommodate power sharing with UNITA, since the former political power had 
just received what they believed to be a stamp of legitimacy from the Angolan 
people by winning the election (Messiant, 2001:290).  
To reinforce its power and control over the economy and society, MPLA 
embarked upon a rein of violence vis-à-vis UNITA military, as well as civilian 
opponents. Their political grip on state institutions was reinforced, including 
gaining an absolute majority in both the Parliament and the government. Once 
again, UNITA could not accept the outcome of the power given to MPLA, and 
waged war, which continued until Joseph Savimbi was killed in 2002, at which 
time Angola regained peace after 27 years of warfare.      
The election in 1992 changed the international attitude towards Angola. The 
transformation from a single-party to a multiparty system was, from a Western 
point of view, what Angola needed in order to be able to start developing after 
the long civil war. Despite wide-ranging irregularities, the UN defined the 
election as free and fair, and the international community observed what they 
described as a ‘transition to democracy’. The international community turned 
                                                        
33 The USSR had already withdrawn from Angola at said point, and did not attend the 
New York negotiations.  
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their official support34 to the MPLA, even when doing so resulted in an abuse of 
power (Messiant, 2007:100).35  Importantly, Angola could now be categorised as 
a ‘democracy’, which legitimised its trade and diplomatic ties with Western 
governments. Other states soon came to understand the firm grip that MPLA had 
over the country and its institutions, in terms of which they had to acknowledge 
that they had to deal with MPLA if there were any national interests that they 
aimed to achieve. The election result had granted legitimacy to MPLA’s one-party 
rule, and the party could continue to preserve the political status quo (Messiant, 
2001).   
Overall, the Angolan democracy can be described as a pseudo-democracy that 
uses a sophisticated form of suppression (Roque, 2008), or, as described by 
Messiant (2007:93), a form of “multiparty politics without democracy”. The 
nature and ideology of the MPLA changed dramatically from when the fight for 
independence first started in the 1970s until Angola finally regained peace in 
2002. Whereas the MPLA started its fight for power on a socialistically grounded 
manifest, the civil war gave little room for investments to be made in the 
infrastructure, development, health, education and other sectors from which the 
population could benefit. The development of the Angolan independent state 
prioritised short-term benefits and survival.    
Political power in Angola was, at the time of the study, extremely centralised, and 
the President and his gatekeepers closely managed the patronage system. 
However, it is important to note that there has been positive change in Angola 
since 2002. The degree of transparency and stability in the country has increased 
since the civil war ended. However, such improvement must be seen in terms of 
the very low base from which it comes, and it must be kept in mind that most of 
the challenges are rooted in deep historical processes that have shaped, and that 
will continue to shape, the context of development in Angola.  
Roque (2008) argues that, since peace came to Angola only as a consequence of 
the military defeat of UNITA in 2002, there has been little incentive for the MPLA 
government to promote true reconciliation through the integration of the 
                                                        
34 The unofficial support from the US and South Africa continued (see other literature).   
35 No literature indicates that UNITA would rule with any less abuse of power.  
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defeated, or to form inclusive national forums in civil society, and to promote 
broad-based political debate in order to create the conditions for transparent, 
just and accountable governance. Since 2002, the peace can only be described as 
a military peace, in which the majority of the people live under a form of 
structural violence (see Johan Galtung), whereas the war continues in the 
Cabinda enclave.  
Whereas the infrastructure in Angola is poor, most of the oil extraction has taken 
place off-shore, with very few parts of the oil industry being affected by the poor 
infrastructure or the ongoing conflict. The Angolan elite was able to establish a 
national oil company, Sonangol, which made doing business with Western 
investors very attractive.  
At an early stage, general economic policies were strategically constructed in a 
manner that encouraged the members of the political elite to establish business 
enterprises within the oil sector. Based on an active collaboration with foreign 
actors, members of the elite have made huge profits out of oil, resulting in an 
obvious mix of roles within the Angolan government and the actors within the oil 
sector. It has become common practice for Angolan Members of Parliament to set 
up commercial companies between themselves and foreign investors for their 
personal gain (Maraques de Morais, 2010). Such a situation has led to a conflict 
of interests, which, in particular, has engendered the risk of corruption in 
Parliament. Moreover, the system has created a political environment in which 
one not only can focus on the political ability, but one in which one can also 
question the political will to create structural change from the side of the 
government.  
Messiant (2007) addresses the above-mentioned argument in her analysis by 
warning that one should be careful to explain the lack of development in Angola 
by means of resorting to an assessment of the civil war, or to the colonial legacy. 
She argues that it is the lack of political will within the political system that 
serves to confound development in Angola, which is a fact that many foreign 
actors in Angola are tending to overlook.  However, the current thesis argues that 
it is largely impossible to explain the lack of political will in Angola without 
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including both the civil war and the colonial legacy in the analysis. Franz Fanon 
(1961) addresses the issues by explaining that the new order that was 
established after colonial rule only defended the old order, and that, by 
approaching Angola in an historical vein, one can identify the roots to the lack of 
political will and development.   
Fanon (1961) explains how the national middle class simply took over 
businesses that were previously occupied by the colonial overlords, from which 
the latter had profited greatly. The national middle class “considers that the 
dignity of the country and its own welfare require that they should occupy all 
these posts” (Fanon, 1961:122).  Foreign companies then had to conduct their 
business and trade through the new national middle class, who “discover[ed] its 
historic mission: that of intermediary” (Fanon, 1961:122). 
Fanon’s concern was that the new national middle class would tend to identify 
itself with the Western bourgeoisie, and therefore would not see it as its mission 
to change and transform the nation. Rather, it was likely that it would see itself 
as “being the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism, rampant 
though camouflaged, which today puts on the masque of neo-colonialism” 
(Fanon, 1961:122). In terms of such development, the nationalist bourgeoisie 
sets up a national system of exploitation to secure their own future, just as the 
Western bourgeoisie had done, and in many ways still do.  
Fanon’s description of the national bourgeoisie fits Angola’s MPLA post-colonial 
system snugly. Currently, the elite in Angola aims for a bourgeoisie democracy in 
which only a small elite owns the means of production.  Difficulties in influencing 
the government, even during the early days of independence, have been 
highlighted in several reports (e.g. Shaxson et al., 2008; Vines et al., 2005). 
Approaching government as the entry point to change has not been effective in 
the case of Angola, and, as has been argued by Fanon (1961), the bourgeoisie 
government does not see it as their task to bring about such change.  
In short, the MPLA was able to adjust to a multiparty system without losing 
power; rather, the transition legitimised the system of one-party rule in addition 
to gaining more international support than in the past. In contrast, it did not 
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create significant change for the majority of the Angolan people in the sense of 
improved redistribution, and the Angolan state has proven to be an inefficient 
entry point for change in Angola. Thus, foreign investors largely continued to 
benefit from the already existing structures. Dos Santos’ ability to withhold 
power was a sign of stability that was largely attractive to Western investors, 
especially compared with the political instability that oil-rich Nigeria has 
experienced. The situation enabled the MPLA regime to consolidate what is often 
described as its economic and political hegemony36 in Angola (Messiant, 
2007:103). Critical political economy theory suggests that the change must come 
from below (Cox, 1987), and empirical evidence, in the case of Angola, suggests 
the same (see Chabal, 2007; Hodges, 2007; Messiant, 2007). It is the forces 
within civil society that must bring about such change by making the 
government accountable to the Angolan people. The next section of the thesis 
will elaborate on Norway’s engagement in Angola by means of the OfD. The last 
section of the will then explore civil society in Angola as an emerging entry point 
for such change. 
4.3 Oil, Peace and Prosperity? 
The Norwegian government has made it clear that Norway – as a small country – 
cannot provide assistance to countries worldwide. Rather, Norway should focus 
on those situations where they can make a difference Lunde and Thune, 2008 . 
In identifying Angola as a major OfD recipient, one can assume that it is regarded 
by the Norwegian government as one such case. The question, however, is 
whether Norway is, in fact, making a difference and contributing to positive 
change in Angola. The following sections of the thesis will explore Norway’s 
engagement in Angola, and the contradictions that are inherent therein.  
4.3.1 Norway’s engagement in Angola 
Norway played an active role during the Southern African liberation struggle 
from the 1960s onwards, continuing to the very end of the South African 
apartheid regime in 1994 (Eriksen, 2000). A close connection between the 
Portuguese Socialist Party and the Norwegian Labour Party, together with strong 
                                                        
36 The notion of hegemony will be revisited later on in the current chapter. 
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engagement from the Norwegian solidarity movements, made the Portuguese 
colonies important recipients of Norwegian support.37 For several reasons, 
Angola received little attention from Norway, despite the contributions that the 
latter country made to the MPLA as early as 1972. No literature was available in 
Norwegian about the struggle in Angola in the early 1970s, and no Norwegian 
had visited the liberation areas inside Angola (Eriksen, 2000:75).  In contrast, 
Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) was much better known in 
Norway than was the MPLA, and the struggle in Angola was seen as complex, 
since there was more than one group that claimed to be the leading movement 
against Portuguese rule (Eriksen, 2000:79).      
The Norwegian government only supported those movements that were 
recognised by the OAU Liberation Committee. In the complex case of Angola, 
official Norwegian support was directed towards only the MPLA, despite the fact 
that there were several movements fighting in the liberation struggle (Eriksen, 
2000:79). However, the Norwegian government and the country’s embassy in 
Lusaka were very hesitant in their approach towards the MPLA, who were given 
much smaller grants than were either FRELIMO or the Partido Africano da 
Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC; African Party for the Independence 
of Guinea and Cape Verde). The hesitation continued after Agostinho Neto’s two 
visits to Norway in 1970 and 1972, and the situation was again discussed with 
Neto in Lusaka in 1974.  
In 1975, all Norwegian support for the MPLA was effectively frozen. Sweden, in 
contrast, which had more or less adopted the same position vis-à-vis the MPLA in 
the early 1970s, declared that they would fulfil their undertakings to MPLA’s 
liberation struggle, and continued with humanitarian assistance after 1975. 
Whereas Sweden established an embassy in Luanda as early as February 1976, it 
took another five years until a Norwegian ambassador first visited Luanda. Only 
in 1986 did Norway put an aid office and a consulate in place (Eriksen, 2000:87).  
Angola itself has traditionally, either through bilateral or multilateral channels, 
received relatively little development assistance compared with other African 
                                                        
37  In addition to the ANC in South Africa. 
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countries.38 Overall, official development aid has played a limited role in Angolan 
social development (Nordås, Tveden and Wiik, 1999).  While Sweden has been 
one of the main donors to Angola, Norway’s support of the MPLA since 1975 has 
been limited.  One reason for the cessation of support was linked to the lack of 
trust in the Angolans’ capacity to manage the assistance, with an even greater 
lack of confidence existing in the leadership of the MPLA. After an extensive 
review of all diplomatic and legal aspects, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
decided not even to acknowledge the Christmas card that was sent to them by 
the Angolan Foreign Minister Jose Eduardo dos Santos at the end of the 1970s 
(Eriksen, 2000:85). Archival sources show that Norway, at the time, was also 
reluctant to appear on the global stage to be supporting a communist party that 
received its main support from Cuba. The concern was taken to such a level that 
all political parties in Parliament, except for the Socialist Labour Party, decided 
to bring all development projects with Cuba to a halt as retaliation for the 
country’s support of the MPLA in Angola (Eriksen, 2000:87).  
Parallel with the change in the international climate in the late 1980s, which saw 
the end of the Cold War, the amount of aid that was provided from Norway to 
Angola increased. Such aid was given first and foremost in the form of 
emergency assistance that increased due to the deterioration of the situation for 
most of the Angolan people.  However, already in July 1987, the first agreement 
was signed between the Norwegian and Angolan governments concerning expert 
assistance that was directly linked to the energy sector (Nordås et al., 1999).  
During the 1990s, Sweden withheld increasingly more aid due to the lack of 
progress that had been achieved up to that point in Angola. The Swedes indicated 
that there was a lack of will from the Angolan government to invest in a better 
future for its people and in the fight against corruption, and in 2011 it was 
announced that the Swedish Embassy in Lusaka would be closed down. Norway, 
in contrast, increased its support from 1994, parallel with the overall shift in its 
                                                        
38 Three reasons for such a phenomenon could be: (1) that many donors thought the 
country itself could use the vast natural resources to benefit the nation to a larger 
extent; (2) the civil war has worsened conditions, with the assistance that has been 
given have not been distributed satisfactory; and (3) the MPLA was said by many donors 
to be on the ‘wrong side’ during the Cold War (Nordås, Tvedten and Wiik, 1999:28).   
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development policy towards West Africa, and with its increase in oil investments 
in the same region. While the main form of aid continued to be emergency 
assistance, support of the peace process, rehabilitation and the infrastructure 
was also increased (Nordås et al., 1999), in which Norway obviously had a self-
interest, since all three elements would determine whether it could continue to 
have access to Angola’s natural resources. Norway’s aid increased even further 
when the petroleum assistance that had first been set in place in 1987 was better 
formalised with the creation of Norad’s OfD programme in 2005. Angola was 
chosen as one of the ten core countries, and later became the country that 
received the most support from Oslo through OfD.  
4.3.2 Contradictions 
A central point in critical political economy, which is highlighted by Robert Cox 
(1987:393), is the importance of identifying contradictions in existing 
relationships and structures.39  Regarding the aims and goals of OfD, one finds 
several contradictions in the relationship between OfD and Angola as a core 
partner. Such contradictions become very interesting when recalling the 
statement that was made by the Norwegian government, arguing that Norwegian 
development aid should be prioritised where Norwegian experience was 
relevant, and that Norwegian aid could make a difference. The remainder of this 
section and the rest of the chapter will highlight some of the contradictions that 
exist regarding Norwegian relevance in Angola, and how there are contradictions 
between what Norwegian petroleum assistance has on offer and what Angola 
needs. 
The first contradiction that will be pointed out is that there are several 
differences between many of the countries that are trapped in the so-called 
‘resource curse’ today, and Norway’s own history and experiences. The most 
general difference is, arguably, that Norway already had a long history of 
democratic governance, strong institutions, a developed industry, and a political 
regime that aimed to create a welfare state even before oil was discovered in the 
country. Norway has little or no knowledge of oil management in a post-conflict 
state such as Angola, where all the democratic institutions are weak and the 
                                                        
39 Cox argues that “it is from these contradictions that change could emerge” (1987:393). 
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political will to redistribute the oil wealth is limited.  
 
On a regional level, it is worth noting that the Norwegian experience has its roots 
in a very stable region, whereas Angola is located in what, for a long time, has 
been described as one of the most unstable regions in the world. Furthermore, 
the two countries have been integrated into the global political economy in two 
very different ways and time periods. Norway was one of the US government’s 
key allies during the Second World War and throughout the Cold War. The 
emerging US hegemon invested in the development of the Norwegian welfare 
state, creating a wealthy and stable northern ally. This resulted in major NATO 
bases in Norway, and Norway – despite its peace image – has been a key ally in 
the war in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Angola, in contrast, has been located in a 
region where the US has not invested to the same extent in reconstruction as 
they did in Europe after the Second World War.40 On the contrary, during the 
Cold War, Angola was ‘on the wrong side’, as defined by the US superpower and 
its South African ally. In contrast to the strategy to develop a sound and stable 
region in the North, the strategy in the South was to destabilise the region, 
especially the socialist countries (Taylor, 2001).  Also, the global environment 
today is very different from when Norway established its oil beneficiation system 
and structures. Whereas most developing countries today are subject to a system 
in which trade liberalisation and open economies are seen as a condition, 
Norway itself practised national protectionism and strict control in the oil sector 
through the nationally owned oil company, Statoil. 41 
 
Another contradiction is the fact that OfD is committed to the EITI as far as 
increasing the transparency of the oil sector goes. OfD’s criteria for becoming a 
core partner country clearly state that members of the EITI will be prioritised. 
                                                        
40 The US put forward an Africa strategy in 2005. However, one cannot compare the 
amount of money that was given to Europe in the form of Marshall Assistance to what 
has been given to Africa. Jakki Cilliers (2008) illustrates the point by arguing that the 
total amount of foreign aid that has been given to Africa since the 1960s from all 
Western countries equals the same amount that the US government spent on one day, 
15 September 2008, alone to bail out US companies due to the financial crises, or during 
the first nine months in Iraq.   
41 Paul Collier (2007) asks, in his book The Bottom Billion, how relevant the experience 
of one of the world’s richest and most peaceful countries is for a country like East Timor.    
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Angola has never applied for membership of, or shown any interest in joining, 
such an initiative. Even though the Angolan state has not joined the EITI, reforms 
in its oil sector have taken place. However, the challenges concerning corruption 
and transparency have been seen only to increase (Norad, 2007), and targeted 
reforms have failed to reverse the trend. In OfD’s criteria for selection of 
cooperative countries, they state: “for long term Oil for Development cooperation 
to be considered, there must be well-documented political commitment to good 
governance, including transparency and anticorruption” (Norad, 2007). When 
comparing the above quote and the literature used to analyse Angola’s political 
economy in the thesis, it seems very contradictory that Angola was chosen as a 
core country for the OfD programme.  There is little evidence “of well-
documented political commitment to good governance, including transparency 
and anticorruption” in the Angolan regime, and the above quote was removed 
from OfD’s webpage in 2009.  The aim of the OfD programme was to make a 
difference where there was at least a minimum standard of governance. 
However, by removing the quote from the webpage, it became unclear whether 
good governance was still a requirement for OfD cooperation (Global Witness, 
2009).  
 
In the political system of Angola, there was certainly an overlap of roles when it 
came to those in power and to interests in the natural resources, which has led to 
a lack of transparency. In addition to the overlap of roles in the Angolan system, 
the same accusations have been directed towards Norway, on the basis that it is 
both a large aid donor and a business agent in the petroleum sector. Norway is 
also playing a dual role in Angola, in terms of which the former country acts both 
as an aid agent advising the government of Angola on how best to deal with 
international oil actors, while simultaneously serving as investors and oil 
extractors by way of Statoil. There would probably be less confusion regarding 
Norway’s role, and it would be easier for the Norwegian government to advise 
and to address the real issues of inequality and the lack of resource distribution 
if Norway did not have a vested interest in its granted oil concessions (Ryggvik, 
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2007:69).42 Another factor that blurs the picture of Norway’s role in Angola is 
that Norwegian commercial interests – through state-owned companies – are 
much more visible to Angolan society than are the government aid programmes, 
which do not have the same marketing strategy. 
In early 2009, Norway produced a White Paper on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), which contained the details regarding the formulation of a 
policy that was intended to guide Norwegian businesses abroad. Unfortunately, 
few unilateral steps have been taken to regulate Norwegian actors abroad. The 
White Paper, rather, leaves it up to each individual actor to define the nature of 
good behaviour (Curtis, 2010:18). Many Norwegian state-owned companies have 
attempted to develop CRS programmes, which they eagerly promote on their 
webpage.43 Such a practice is especially popular in those countries where the 
social aspects of doing business are questioned. For example, the Norwegian 
company, Hydro, decided to invest more in CSR by donating NOK 4m to the Dos 
Santos Foundation. Ironically, the foundation is owned and managed by 
President Dos Santos himself, and distributes resources and invests in projects 
that serve his best interests (Messiant, 2007), which is a fact that will be 
discussed further in the last part of the current chapter. Such an investment can 
by no means be seen as supporting the poor. Rather, it can be seen as a gift from 
Hydro more or less directly given to President Dos Santos and his regime.44    
Another contradiction that is worth noting, and which is highly relevant for the 
current analysis, is a statement that is made by the Norwegian government. 
Norway should be present where it can make a difference (Lunde and Thune, 
2008:15). Norad’s evaluation report (2007) states that if the maximum benefit is 
to be gained from the OfD project, it is important that they enter the picture early 
on. Such a statement correlates with the literature concerning the resource 
                                                        
42 In addition to the oil sector, the Norwegian government is actively promoting Angola 
as an attractive country in which to invest for other sectors as well. For example, Hydro 
was, at the time of the study, investing in aluminium plants, and Yara, Norway’s largest 
producer of fertiliser, was also investing in the country.   
43 See, for e.g., www.statoil.com or www.hydro.com. 
44
 Hydro admitted that they contributed the amount that they did because they were afraid that 
they would be thrown out of the country if they did not act upon President dos Santos’ request 
for such a donation.  
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curse. ‘A small window of opportunity’ is identifiable between when resources 
are discovered and when income starts flowing into an economy (ECON, 2004). 
In the case of Ghana, where OfD was involved at an early stage, the results could 
be quite different from those that have emerged since Angola first discovered its 
natural oil resources in 1955. In Angola, oil played an important part in the civil 
war, and has already become a significant contributor to the Angolan economy. 
Thus, the literature intimates that Angola’s window of opportunity has now 
closed and that Norway has little to contribute to oil-related challenges at such a 
late point.  
In many ways, Angola would seem to be more of a mismatch than a match in 
terms of being considered a main cooperation country by the OfD. Based on the 
last internal evaluation of the OfD programme, Angola is also a country that has 
shown the least effect of the aid programme (Norad, 2007). However, it is still 
the largest recipient of OfD support, and it is still regarded as a core country for 
investments by Statoil, Hydro, Yara and other Norwegian investors that see a 
business opportunity in the country.45 Ultimately, therefore, even though 
Norway professes to be helping to bring about progressive change in Angola, its 
role may be seen to be a much more ambiguous one.  
4.4 Status Quo versus Change 
4.4.1 Civil Society – an Emerging Entry Point for Change 
As mentioned earlier, the situation in Angola is often described as one in which 
the MPLA has political and economic hegemony. Gramsci’s exploration of the 
concept of hegemonic forces within the state and how such forces are 
maintained is built on by Robert Cox in developing his critical political economy 
framework (Cox, 1983). Both Gramsci and Cox argue that it is meaningless to 
limit the definition of a state to only those elements that belong to government. 
Rather, Gramsci depicts the hegemony of the bourgeoisie in terms of their 
concessions to subordinate classes in exchange for the consent to bourgeois 
                                                        
45 At the time of the study, Statoil and Hydro had been in Angola since 1993, and, by the 
end of 2006, the total investments amounted to NOK 40bn in oil alone (Hanssen, 2008b).   
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leadership, thereby illustrating the power of civil society within the state (Cox, 
1983). Gramsci’s definition of hegemony enables him to enlarge his definition of 
the state and he argues that one has to include the underpinnings of the political 
structure of civil society to make the notion of the state meaningful. In this way, 
the notion of the state is extended to include the political structure of civil 
society within it, as rulers are forced to recognise “the hegemonic structures of 
civil society as the basic limits of their political action” (Cox, 1983:126).    
Robert Cox describes states such as Angola as ‘protostates’, with the world 
economy not depending on such states, though they are important, due to the 
extent that they export natural resources that Western countries need (Cox, 
1987). According to Cox, such states do not receive their support from the 
population or from civil society, but external actors support the elite in the states 
with a supply of arms and credit. Due to their only receiving support from 
greater powers weakened the hegemony of the MPLA, according to Gramsci and 
Cox (1987). The MPLA has been able to suppress civil society, with them having 
successfully diminished their ability to form a strong counterpart.  
The civil society in Angola is still very young. Govender and Skagestad (2009:20) 
argue that the first civil society organisations (CSOs) in Angola emerged at the 
beginning of the 1990s, with them having experienced many historical, political 
and economic challenges since then. Many of the challenges are rooted in the 
colonial past and in the pre-independence period (Amundsen and Abreu, 2006). 
Further, the MPLA has been able to control and, in many ways, to suppress the 
NGOs and civil society after 1975. The NGOs remain weak institutions, due to 
their lack of funds and organisational capacity, as well as their inability to 
mobilise the electorate. In an attempt to extend their control, Dos Santos himself 
has created a group of civil society groups over which he has direct control 
(Messiant, 2007:113),46 while, simultaneously, the ‘real’ civil society is subject to 
a widespread culture of fear (Vidal, 2007a:173).47  
                                                        
46 For more detail on the Dos Santos Foundation, see Messiant (2001). 
47 In November 2005, 100 protestors were arrested by the National Police when they 
charged the government with mis-spending of billions of public dollars (Ng and Le 
Billion, 2007:45).  
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Nevertheless, civil society has slowly become more prominent, with it having 
largely come to represent an emerging entry point for change in Angola. The Civil 
Society Conference that was held in 2007 was noted as a possible ‘turning point’ 
for civil society in Angola. Much hope has been expressed that different CSOs will 
exert an increasing amount of pressure on democratic mechanisms and build a 
capacity that will make civil society more visible and structured (Shaxson et al., 
2008:13). Civil society is growing stronger, and it holds great promise, both in 
Angola and in extending into the region.  
In contrast, in addition to the colonial legacy and the MPLA’s attempt to restrain 
the CSOs in Angola, Alexander and Gilbert (2008) argue that donor funding for 
the civil society in Angola is lacking. In terms of contemporary development in 
Angola, the need might exist for increased international support, both financial 
and advisory, in the form of guidance, experience, and assistance. The Angolan 
civil society still has a long way to go before it can be classified as strong or well 
organised. It is debatable whether an alternative source of support to Angola 
could be based on Norway’s experience in developing a strong civil society. The 
goal should be for the Angolan civil society itself to form a counterpart to the 
government, in terms of which the government should be accountable to its 
population, and not only seek its support from global structures. The attainment 
of such a goal would also require returning to the form of support that Norway 
first contributed to Angola, before the former country’s economic interests 
became so evident, namely one that is based on solidarity. 
OfD notes the important role that civil society plays in its attempt to save 
countries from the resource curse. However, only a fraction of the OfD 
programme is linked to civil society in general. Out of the Nok 94 984 000 
disbursed to OfD activities in 2009, only around Nok 20m, in total, was linked to 
CSOs. In addition, most of the money was disbursed to CSOs which were not 
Angolan, but international, such as the Revenue Watch Institute, the EITI and 
other Norwegian NGOs. Furthermore, Norway was, at the time of the study, in a 
process of phasing out support to CSOs in Angola in general (Hanssen, 2008b) – a 
shift that probably would slow down the process of change even more in Angola. 
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This underpins the importance of seeing Norway’s engagement in Angola 
alongside significant commercial interests.  
4.4.2  Norway’s Ability to Foster Structural Change 
Many African countries have grown highly dependent on foreign aid since 
independence. Before many countries in Africa gained their independence, Franz 
Fanon (1961) was able to predict that most of the African elites would not be 
able to rise to the historically progressive role that the European bourgeoisie had 
played during the first part of industrialisation. Following political 
independence, and in line with Fanon’s prediction, foreign aid became one of the 
central mechanisms used to co-opt elites in order to maintain the economic and 
political status quo, thereby helping to disarm any indigenous attempts at 
structural change or independent development outside the normative structures 
of power (Schulz, 2001:106). Although global political and economic actors and 
forces played a role in shaping the context of the politically enfranchised political 
and economic elites in many African states, the local/national agency in shaping 
the practices must also be recognised. Furthermore, in no way is good 
governance, with its insistence on the building of efficient governmental 
institutions and transparent rule, irrelevant. Rather, as the current thesis has 
intended to highlight, the main constraints to the realisation of good governance 
in many African countries lie not only within the continent or in the African 
states themselves. Mainly, it is the structure of the IPE that retains most of the 
power and control in the neo-colonial era. Such structure helped shape the 
context, practices and institutions that have facilitated a certain set of state 
practices. Schulz concludes: 
Until foreign aid donors are willing to address this issue squarely, and to 
end their complicity in this system, the governments and peoples of the 
South will be condemned to a perpetuation in a status quo that 
structurally condemns them to witness an ever-widening gap between 
the rich and the poor.  
(Schulz, 2001:107)     
Within the constraints of the position of a traditional middle power, Norway is 
not in a position to influence or to shape global structures on its own, even 
though, in many cases, it has supported such change rhetorically and in foreign 
policy discourses. Norway is situated ideologically and materially within a global 
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context of US hegemony and concomitant neo-liberal political and economic 
practices, and is thus limited to acting within and challenging the overarching 
structures. Such conventional middle powers as the Norwegian state are system 
supporters, because they rely on the global configuration of power for their own 
position, as well as benefiting from their position in a myriad number of ways. In 
this regard, a bilateral aid programme provided by a middle power, such as OfD, 
is not likely to have a major influence on global structures. The Norwegian state’s 
approach and policies are, thus, inefficient agents for the achievement of 
structural change.   
However, when employing the rhetoric of foreign policy discourse that favours 
change, making use of a terminology of good governance and development only 
serves to support and strengthen the underlying hegemonic system. The 
Norwegian state’s foreign policy can be classified within the framework of 
traditional middle powers, by masking reality, upholding the status quo, and not 
displacing any fundamental global structures or institutions. Engaging with a 
predictable and stable Angola is obviously in Norway’s strategic national 
interest, as doing so would facilitate bilateral relations. Behaving as a traditional 
middle power, Norway’s engagement with Angola, through OfD, is characterised 
by pursuing economic gains. By promoting a ‘comparative advantage’ – upon 
which petroleum-related aid is based – one can also see how aid has become a 
comparative advantage for Norwegian interests. It is evident that, when one has 
Norwegian officials sitting close to the oil administration in petro-states, advising 
them on how better to deal with international oil companies, trade and aid are to 
the advantage of the Norwegian state. The motivations behind OfD might be seen 
as twofold. On one hand, Norway builds on its niche and reputation as a 
successful oil-rich nation that has not been trapped in the resource curse. On the 
other hand, OfD is also seen as an opportunity to internationalise Norway’s 
petroleum industry.  
Whereas the aid from Norway to Africa originally was based upon solidarity and 
a very limited national self-interest, a change has obviously occurred, of which 
OfD is a good example. The neo-liberal development approach emphasises the 
increasing role of involving private business in development strategies. Through 
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OfD, the Norwegian state has formulated an aid programme, masking its neo-
liberal development approach by incorporating Norwegian business interests 
and development goals in the same programme. The phenomenon is not 
necessarily new – however, it is very well institutionalised through OfD, 
illustrating the underlying neo-liberal turn in Norwegian aid.  
In an attempt to identify entry points for change in Angola, the present chapter 
has concluded that global and state levels alone would be inefficient entry points 
for change in Angola. Several global actors are interested in maintaining the 
existing structures in Angola, largely in order to be able to extract natural 
resources under the same conditions and at the same profit levels.  With the lack 
of political will from the government of Angola, and a lack of political will from 
the international community, it is unlikely that any attempts will be made by the 
actors concerned actually to deal with the structures of the political economy in 
Angola, and Angola’s position in the hierarchy of the global order. The USA is 
intent on cultivating relationships outside the Middle East, so that it can decrease 
its dependency on the oil supply from such an unstable region. It is, therefore, 
unwilling to place pressure on the Angolan government over issues of economic 
governance and redistribution, since it benefits from the maintenance of the 
current status quo.  
Angola is a country that has been dependent on foreign aid to a much lesser 
extent than have other countries in Africa, with the result that the instrument of 
foreign pressure, using aid as a ‘carrot and stick’, remains limited. However, 
Angola is not as fundamentally isolated and resistant to external pressure as one 
might assume.  The Angolan government has, in the past, been able to take an a 
la carte approach to different reforms and to advice given from foreign donors 
and external agents (Shaxson et al., 2008). In other words, they have chosen 
those reforms that have been beneficial for the local elite, or have opted for 
reforms that avoid impacting on any of the fundamental political and economic 
structures, enabling the existing elite to remain in power.    
In contrast, OfD has been assisting the Angolan state in developing a more 
efficient tax system, which, from a Western point of view, is seen as one of the 
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essential requisites that has to be in place in order for resource-rich countries to 
benefit from their natural wealth. Norway has historically followed the trajectory 
of a typical Western European country, which underwent state–society 
bargaining over taxation throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and which 
helped form the structures that are currently in place. 
Moore (2007) argues that taxation matters is of fundamental concern when good 
governance is a goal, since it can be seen as a form of bargaining between the 
government and its citizens that can benefit both state structures and social 
welfare. Taxation matters can be used as a social fiscal contract, which hopefully 
will result in an efficient and accountable public authority and a higher standard 
of living for the general population. However, when the main source of income 
comes from natural resources in states that have not undergone a long process of 
state–society formation and political and economic transformation, governments 
run by elites often turn to global actors with whom they can negotiate to 
maintain their income, rather than orienting themselves towards their citizens. 
Such behaviour, in turn, is related to the process of state formation in Africa, 
which, from the outset of colonial rule, was oriented towards supporting ‘native 
administrations’ that could facilitate colonial rule and processes of extraction. 
The institutions and practices of indirect rule colonialism that were Angola’s 
political inheritance on the eve of independence, did not transform overnight. 
Former colonial regimes supported local elites that supported Western interests 
and deliberately undermined political leadership that aimed to transform 
structures and political practices from below (Murithi, 2009; Rodney, 1972). The 
global environment thus aided in creating perverse incentives for the political 
elites to maintain the status quo. The incentive to engage with the citizens and to 
create public institutions was weakened (IDS, 2010:70). Mamdani (1996) further 
speaks of the problem of citizenship inherited from colonial rule. That is, the 
bifurcated political system that created both citizens (governed by civil law and 
administration) and subjects (governed by native law and authorities) has left 
behind a problematic legacy, in terms of an absence of civil society and citizens 
who are equal under the law.  
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The Norwegian International Development Minister, Erik Solheim, declared, as 
have many other ministers around the world, that Norway will continue to 
support the Angolan government through state–state relations and bilateral aid 
(Report to Storting, no. 13, 2008–2009), even though such an avenue has not 
proven to be an effective point for fundamental change, either theoretically or 
empirically. Generally, industrialised countries have been unwilling to jeopardise 
their national oil companies and other national interests in terms of their 
relations with Angola, and, therefore, have chosen not to challenge the method 
and style of governance in Angola in any fundamental way, but rather to 
continue their support for maintaining the status quo.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RHETORIC, POLICY AND REALITY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
An article in The Economist (2007) describes Norway as a country with one of 
the world’s best reputations for peace, but also notes that the road ahead is a 
mixed one for such a middle power as Norway. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
Norway was able to position itself as a nation seeking peaceful solutions between 
the superpowers. In the 1980s and 1990s, when the neo-liberal agenda was the 
dominant paradigm, the Norwegian model illustrated that a strong and active 
government was still important in terms of political economy. As the Norwegian 
national self-interest has become more evident in the country’s foreign affairs 
and aid, the state has come increasingly to struggle more to stand apart from 
other states.  
The current thesis has, so far, critically challenged the theoretical foundation of 
Norway’s most prominent aid programme, OfD, using a critical political economy 
framework. The thesis has also challenged the given assumptions of the 
Norwegian aid policy, highlighted contradictions, and weighed rhetoric against 
reality. This final chapter will draw what has been said in the previous chapters 
together and consider Norway’s role, in terms of the OfD in Angola, as a 
supporter of the status quo on both the national and the global level. Many of the 
core arguments and findings from the previous chapters will be revisited in this 
chapter.  
5.2 Summary of Findings 
Chapter One gave the historic background to the Norwegian foreign aid switch 
towards West Africa from the mid-1990s onwards, describing how the OfD 
followed a decade later. The background regarding the Norwegian self-concept 
of being a selfless aid agent with no national interest in development aid showed 
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the importance of the topic. Chapter One also highlighted the lack of academic 
research about the topic.   
The Norwegian self-conception of a ‘do-good nation’, linked to the concept of 
middle powers, was further elaborated on in Chapter Two. While there is little 
controversy in the literature concerning Norway’s position as a middle power, 
Norway is distinguished more accurately as a traditional middle power due to its 
characteristics (wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic, and not regionally 
influential) and its behaviour, as creating an identity that is distinct from other 
powers and how it pressures for global reform (Jordaan, 2003:165). It was also 
argued that the adoption of a critical approach is most useful when analysing 
Norway’s role and its actions within the global structures, due to its focus on the 
middle powers’ position in the global political economy, with the elite being 
complicit in the neo-liberal project. Furthermore, the adoption of such an 
approach also serves to problematise Norway’s ‘do-good image’ and to identify 
the element of national self-interest on a deeper level.    
Chapter Three illustrated that the theoretical frameworks upon which OfD is 
based, namely the resource curse thesis and the good governance agenda, are 
weakly developed and that there is a clear need for a more nuanced approach. It 
is important to understand the academic gaps in the relationship between 
natural resources and development, and that, when only relying on Western 
scholars, one should be cautious when dealing with the literature. With the 
greater focus on institution-building as part of development assistance over the 
last decade, there has been an absence of deeper analysis of how institutions 
evolve and persist. Both the resource curse thesis and the rhetoric concerning 
good governance are developed by Western research institutions, and have been 
adopted by Norwegian aid policy, which clearly represents a problem-solving 
approach.  
Chapter Four looked at Angola as an empirical case study. The country 
experienced 400 years of slave trade from the beginning of the 16th century 
onwards, with millions of the Angolan workforce being taken overseas 
(Guimaraes, 2001). The era was followed by half a century of systematic and 
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industrialised colonialism, during which the Portuguese exploited the country’s 
natural resources. The political economy of Angola has maintained the same 
basic structure for the last few centuries, in which export and exploration have 
been the main features. The power structures remain the same in the post-
colonial era as they were before independence in 1975, with the Portuguese elite 
merely being replaced by a native Angolan elite. Oil was one of the key 
components in financing the 27-year long civil war from 1975 to 2002. However, 
the end of the war in 2002 has not led to any significant fundamental change, as 
the majority of the population is still excluded from benefiting from the country’s 
large natural resources.  
The current thesis has, in general, argued that structural change is key to 
development, and that it is important to understand how positive change takes 
place. The aim is to identify entry points for such change, with a critical political 
economy analysis being able to serve the purpose. There is no shortage in 
theoretical toolkits within development agencies. However, when approaching 
underdeveloped, fragile and post-conflict states, the critical political economy 
approach has been used to a limited extent in recent decades. Only in recent 
years has the approach regained recognition among development agencies 
(UNDP, 2010). 
While the Norwegian attempt to trigger change by engaging with the 
government of Angola has been rather ineffective, the attempt remains the main 
entry point for change for Norway’s focus on Angola. Whereas the theory points 
to civil society as being a more effective entry point, the channel is receiving 
most of its support in terms of rhetoric, and not real action. OfD can be described 
as problem-solving, rather than critical, and has, to a limited extent, brought 
about fundamental change for the majority of the Angolan population.  
Recognising the benefits of a critical political economy analysis, many 
development agencies have incorporated the approach in their development 
assistance frameworks.48 So far, Norway, including Norad, has not adopted a 
                                                        
48 For example, The Netherlands Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis includes 
an overview of the social and political factors that shape the political system, including 
both formal and informal institutions of the states and private sector. Another example 
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political economy analysis in their work. Kolstad et al. (2009) clearly conclude 
that the lack of political economy analysis in OfD, as it currently is, is a handicap 
for the programme and it will, therefore, not bring about the change that is 
needed in Angola. The current thesis has stressed the importance of adopting a 
holistic understanding of the challenges and the political processes that enable 
states to be responsive, capable and inclusive if one aims to contribute to 
development that will have a real impact on the poorest of the people, which, in 
the case of Angola, are most of the population.  
5.3 Norway – a Traditional Middle Power in Angola? 
Norwegian politicians take pride in formulating policies that reflect concern for 
the poorer parts of the world. The Norwegian government also pushes for 
reform by challenging large global multilateral institutions, such as the World 
Bank to reform so that it can benefit its clients, and not only its rich owners. In 
general, there have been few global reforms since neo-liberalism first started in 
the 1980s. However, in 2005 a Norwegian coalition government presented an 
extremely offensive new political platform in the form of the Soria Moria 
Declaration (2005). The rhetoric in the Declaration gives the impression of it 
being a ‘post-imperialist’ North–South agenda (Bond, 2008:77), which is led by a 
new government with a strong influence from a progressive Norwegian civil 
society.  
The political declaration in 2005 set a high standard for a financial shift between 
the North and South, so that a more offensive position could be adopted towards 
the redistribution of global wealth. There was a clear message in the Declaration 
that Norway should withdraw its support from such neo-liberal institutions as 
the World Bank and the IMF, since the institutions had illustrated that the will 
for reform was marginal. Rather, Norway would increase its support through 
other multilateral channels, such as the UN, focusing on development 
programmes and emergency assistance. However, the political platform remains 
                                                                                                                                                              
is Sweden’s Political Power Analysis. Even the World Bank, which traditionally was 
reluctant to include too much political analysis in its development strategies, is now 
including a political economy framework called the Problem-driven Governance and 
Political Economy Analysis Good Practice Framework.  
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to build on the neo-liberal rhetoric that is associated with the World Bank and 
other neo-liberal institutions, in discussions of transparency, anti-corruption and 
good governance.  
The political platform in the Soria Moria Declaration included a commitment to 
reducing the illegitimate debt burden for poor countries, with it wanting to make 
sure that Norway did not financially support the Third World, in terms of 
liberalisation and privatisation. In February 2007, the first actual move away 
from the World Bank was taken. Norway withdrew its support to the World 
Bank’s privatisation facility, due to several critical NGO reports. In August of the 
same year, the Norwegian Petroleum Fund (The Norwegian Pension Fund) sold 
its shares in many global funds and major firms, such as Wall Mart, DRD Gold 
Limited, Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold, due to ethical concerns about such 
funds and firms. Bond (2008:79) argues: 
these initiatives appear to potentially shake post-Cold War, North–South 
power relationships and suggest new prospects for a social-democratic 
reform agenda for global governance. However, much deeper dilemmas 
remain because some of the Norwegian reforms legitimate the existing 
system rather than confronting and weakening it.   
When it comes to actually shaking the prevailing global structures and to 
negating the neo-liberal institutions to which Norway has been so loyal since 
their origin, a closer look reveals that Norway has not really kept the promises 
that it made in the Soria Moria Declaration in 2005. First and foremost, Norway, 
in 2006, cancelled debts in the shipping industry from the 1970s for many Third 
World countries. The government later admitted that the loans given to 21 
countries in the 1970s were not sustainable and that they benefited Norwegian 
interests. The interest and profit that Norway had made on the loans were not 
paid back in 2006, although Norway will eventually profit from the agreements 
any way (Bond, 2008). Another example is the Norwegian move away from the 
World Bank in 2007, with Norway withdrawing USD 2.8m from the Private 
Public Investment Fund, with, only a few weeks later, the government of Norway 
disbursing USD 200m to the World Bank International Development Association.  
As Chapter Two showed, it is not the fact that Norway is a substantial promoter 
of peace, or that it gives a large amount of its GDP in aid, or the fact that it 
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participates in multilateralism that makes Norway a middle power. It is rather 
Norway’s position, role and interest in the global political economy vis-à-vis the 
world order that makes the middle powers not challenge the fundamental 
position and global structures. Power relations are deep and one needs to go 
deeper than only accepting a surface-level rhetoric when asking whether 
Norway really does challenge the neo-liberal structure with the aim of creating 
change. Bond (2008:93, 95) concludes: 
Oslo’s ongoing collaboration with the Bank in many settings sets back the 
cause of social justice, by continuing to provide legitimacy to one of the 
world’s most undemocratic and economically regressive institutions… For 
the Norwegian Government, the time has come to decide whether 
resources and legitimacy will continue to be given to those, like Wolfowitz 
and Zoellick, who will set back progress, or instead to those who will 
advance it – which, in prior decades, were given to oppressed civil society 
and liberation movements in Africa.  
 
The school of neo-realism suggests that there is no space for ethical concerns in 
foreign policy. Neo-realism, as a broad theoretical approach, would argue that 
Norway’s engagement in Angola eliminates the poor majority of Angola and 
identifies the strategic interest of Norway as the main reason for its presence in 
Angola. The individual conditions, rights and welfare have little implication – as 
long as they do not impact on the state’s power. This thesis has elaborated on a 
more Marxist view, suggesting that states act like this since middle powers have 
a larger interest in acting in relation to other capitalistic states to maintain the 
status quo in global political economy structures.49  
A quarter of a century ago, it probably seemed very unlikely that Angola would 
become one of Norway’s most important partners. However, at the time of the 
current study, 40 per cent of Statoil’s international production took place in 
Angola, with Hydro being about to sign one of the largest international contracts 
ever to be signed abroad by a Norwegian company, for a hydropower station, 
including an aluminium platform worth NOK 30bn, in partnership with the 
                                                        
49 B. Barratt (2005) looks closely at how human rights abuse and poor conditions for the 
people in the recipient country only have a negative influence on aid, with the aid donor 
having neither an economic nor a strategic interest in the recipient country. She 
continues her argument by claiming that the middle powers, in particular, refuse to 
punish states that are of strategic interest or importance to greater powers and allies.      
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Angolan government. NGOs have, for several decades, been producing reports 
documenting that the Angolan government is looting the state and its people for 
its oil revenues.50 Nonetheless, the Norwegian government states very clearly in 
their White Paper related to Norway’s approach towards the developing world 
(Report to the Storting. no. 13, 2008–2009) that Norway will continue its state–
state support to Angola. The three largest Norwegian companies in Angola are 
partly state-owned.51 All the above-mentioned investments have serious 
implications for the Norwegian economy, with one example being that Norway’s 
national interest is largely present in Angola.  
The Stortingsraport’s (Report to the Storting, no. 15, 2008–2009) White Paper 
touches upon the dilemma of having a national interest in those countries to 
which Norway also contributes aid. The White Paper states that many 
developing countries have become important actors in areas that used to be 
dominated by the developed countries. The argument is made that one can no 
longer see the economic world as being divided into ‘North’ and ‘South’, since 
many of Norway’s most important present-day partners in trade are amongst the 
least developed countries in the world. The government paper states very clearly 
that Angola is one of the countries in which Norway has substantive interests. 
Norwegian self-interest is becoming increasingly more evident. Norwegian 
companies are investing ever more in the West African region, especially in 
Angola, with its commercial role in the area rising fast, whereas the political role 
remains very limited.      
With an increase in the number of Norwegian embassies in West Africa, parallel 
with an increase of Norwegian private sector investments, the role of the 
embassy has become twofold. Embassies are tasked with managing development 
assistance, while simultaneously promoting Norwegian business opportunities 
in the region, assuming that doing so will benefit both the developing country 
and Norwegian business. However, there is no guarantee that increased business 
will automatically result in improved development and welfare. It will all depend 
                                                        
50 See, for e.g., Global Witness reports on www.globalwitness.com or Alexander and 
Gilbert (2008). 
51 Statoil, Hydro and Yara. 
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on the structures that are present in the country of origin. In the case of Angola, 
it is evident that a record-high GDP growth has not had a large effect on the 
standard of living of most of the population.   
In relation to the guiding research question of the thesis – regarding whom the 
OfD programme is aiding in Angola – the answer seems clear, namely the 
Angolan elite government, which was elected in 1992. By continuing with state–
state assistance, the Angolan government will choose to implement those 
reforms that do not challenge the power balance within the country.  
The main point of Chapter Four was to show that it is in the interests of the key 
actors within the IPE related to oil as well as to the elite in Angola to maintain 
the status quo in the country, from which Norway also benefits. To reform 
governance means that one needs to challenge the established power structures, 
which entails a political process, whereas Norway’s role in the whole West 
African region is limited. Changes in power structures are often hard to achieve, 
with such change, in the present instance, requiring change within the Angolan 
elite. However, such changes are also not popular in the North, since they most 
likely would lead to the destabilisation of entire nations.    
The political reality of Norway’s engagement in Angola is far from being 
‘exceptional’. In the current study, a critical approach was adopted to reveal and 
explain the self-interest of Norway’s foreign aid policy by approaching it 
historically and by questioning given assumptions and highlighting 
contradictions. The Norwegian presence in Africa is also undergoing significant 
change. Whereas, half a century ago, Norway had few interests on the continent, 
the picture is quite different today. Africa is becoming a very important trading 
partner for Norway, and their economic relationship is likely to intensify. Such 
intensification would definitely change Norway’s role on the continent, and if 
Norway were not able to make some coherent decisions regarding the role that 
they want to play, it is in danger of losing its image as a ‘different’ actor, which 
will be likely to weaken Norway’s image of being an altruistic aid donor. Without 
clearly prioritising those areas where Norway can make a difference, the country 
will lose its current ethical niche and its comparative advantage.  
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Norway’s foreign aid policy lacks coherence and is obviously contradictory in 
many ways. OECD (DAC, 2008) concluded that Norway “has not yet developed an 
overall approach” to promoting coherence in government policy, and that it 
“needs to turn the rhetoric into reality” (cited in Curtis, 2010:23). Lunde and 
Thune (2008) concluded that Norway’s primary foreign policy interest lies in 
strengthening the international legal, social, economic and security order, in line 
with its ally, the USA. Much of the reasoning behind such support could be found 
in Norway’s global position, with Norway deriving much of its wealth, and its 
position, from the system.52 In Norway, interests and ideals, such as peace, good 
governance and stability, are often closely linked.  
Broadly speaking, Norway’s foreign policy can be seen as incoherent, with some 
policies supporting the present world order, whilst other policies are reformist 
and indicate a will to bring about change, though such change is rarely seen in 
reality (Curtis, 2010:25). The OfD does not deal with the underlying challenges 
that stagger development in Angola, and its approach can be described as being 
problem-solving rather than critical. Approaches towards the Third World are 
changing, with political economy analysis becoming more acknowledged as an 
analytical approach. The current thesis encourages Norway and Norad to follow 
the trend. 
5.4 Final Remarks and Further Research 
This thesis has raised many critical questions, with it not being the aim to answer 
all, but rather to illustrate that such issues deserve more attention within the 
context of development. Whereas the thesis has limited itself to focusing on the 
Norwegian state as an actor, it is evident that the country’s business interests are 
increasing worldwide. The effect will be that Norway’s international image will 
largely come to depend on the behaviour of the country’s private sector 
development abroad, since the investments concerned exceed public ones. If the 
private and state-owned actors do not see it as their goal to operate in 
                                                        
52 Curtis (2010) highlights UN’s Convention on the Law of the Sea, in terms of which 
Norway obtains most of its oil and fish resources, as an example.  
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accordance with human rights principles, and continue to benefit from 
undemocratic systems, such as that of Angola, their doing so will have a negative 
effect on Norway’s image and reputation. The OfD is, in many ways, structured so 
as to take care of some of the concerns, but as was mentioned earlier, the 
programme has been criticised for being a gate-opener for Norwegian oil 
companies and commercial interests.  The picture of who Norway is and what its 
interests are in Africa is becoming increasingly more complex, and it is obviously 
a simplification to see Norway as a single-minded actor. In terms of 
development, with ever more Norwegian actors expanding into Angola, it 
becomes pressingly more important to follow the effects of such development. 
Consideration must be given to how development affects the Angolan 
population. Whether it contributes to a strengthening of the Angolan elite, or 
whether there are possibilities of continuing the expansion in a manner that 
benefits the Angolan people to a larger extent than does the current system is 
debatable.  
Angola itself sees it as important to diversify its partnerships, so that it can 
maintain beneficial economic arrangements with those partners whom it 
chooses. Their striving to maintain such arrangements creates a situation in 
which the government of Angola can remain in better control, without any 
external actors becoming overly influential. China is one of the largest external 
actors in Angola, and is relatively honest about its intentions in the country, 
which concerns its need for Angola’s natural resources so that it can continue its 
own development. China’s approach is also quite different from the approach 
that has been taken by Norway, with the former country wishing to trade in 
natural resources for rapid post-conflict infrastructure. China’s approach has 
received much attention, since its foreign policy does not concern itself with the 
human rights situation in the recipient country. Another way of seeing China’s 
approach is that it contributes towards an infrastructure that not only benefits 
the elite in Angola, but which also reaches the broader parts of the population to 
a much larger extent than the Norwegian aid seems to do. Clearly, more in-depth 
research is needed by those actors who do not have a commercial interest in 
Angola, in order to gain a better understanding of what kind of aid modality 
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would be most beneficial and effective in uplifting the living standards of the 
Angolan poor.  
Norway’s position as a traditional middle power in the future is also highly 
dependent on the potential of the emerging powers. Such countries as China, 
India and Brazil are playing an increasing role in international relations, and, at 
one point, they might challenge today’s world system. In an era of US-led 
dominance, traditional middle powers have been in a favourable position, with 
them supporting the system since their own position has been dependent on 
such an hegemonic power.  However, in light of new developments in the 
international system, their positions might be threatened, and they could easily 
disappear into a structurally irrelevant group of countries (Toje, 2010).  Based 
on the understanding that Norway’s power relations with other countries 
depends on the hierarchy that is centred around US hegemony, further research 
is needed into how a changing world order might impact on Norway. 
It has not been the intention of the current researcher to dwell on specific CSOs 
which OfD could or should support, since this, in itself, is a challenging question 
with no simple answer. Supporting CSOs and creating mechanisms for a 
participatory civil society does not mean that civil society actors will act in unity, 
which would result in collective action. Research that has been undertaken by 
the Institute of Development Studies (IDS, 2010) concludes that collective 
actions that benefit the poor do not automatically come from strengthening 
CSOs. Whereas some organisations have a bigger influence than others, it is not 
obvious that those with wide national networks necessarily represent the broad 
interests of civil society as a whole. The study concludes that it is probably most 
beneficial to support those civil society networks that have a strong vertical 
reach so as to be able to achieve improvements in social accountability (IDS, 
2010:45). More research is needed to find a suitable way in which Norway can 
help to strengthen Angolan civil society. 
The difficult question in the development discussion is obviously whether it is 
best to continue doing ‘business as usual’, while hoping for the Angolan model of 
‘baking the cake first, and sharing it later’ to evolve until, one day, the Angolan 
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poor will benefit from the country’s vast natural resources. The alternative is to 
encourage Norway to retain its integrity and to take a stand that does not allow 
for the conducting of business with a non-democratic government, such as that 
of Angola, so long as the latter country’s political will to redistribute its oil 
revenues remains limited.    
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